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Summons Issued (2) 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff: Melaleuca, Inc. Notice Of Appearance T. Jon J. Shindurling 
Jason Wood 
Filing: A- Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Jon J. Shindurling 
Paid by: Wood, T. Jason (attorney for Melaleuca, 
Inc.) Receipt number: 0019437 Dated: 
413012009 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
Melaleuca, Inc. (plaintiff) 
Notice of Removal of Action to Federal Court Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Service - 5-12-09 Rick Foeller Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Service - 5-12-09 Natalie Foeller Jon J. Shindurling 
Civil Disposition entered for: Foeller, Natalie, Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant; Foeller, Rick, Defendant; Melaleuca, 
Inc., Plaintiff. Filing date: 512212009 
Case Status Changed: Closed Jon J. Shindurling 
****CASE HAS BEEN REMANED BACK TO Jon J. Shindurling 
DISTRICT COURT BY THE FEDERAL 
COURTS*** 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0712712009 10:15 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to compel arbitration - set PTC & trial 
dates - Def wants to appear by phone - depos in 
Utah 
Defendant: Foeller, Rick Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Defendant: Foeller, Natalie Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Motion to Compel Arbitration 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel 
Arbitration 
Affidavit of Natalie Foeller 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Arbitration 712712009@ 10:15 AM 
Filing: 17 - All Other Cases Paid by: Armstrong, 
Richard J. (attorney for Foeller, Rick) Receipt 
number: 0028425 Dated: 612412009 Amount: 
$58.00 (Check) For: Foeller, Rick (defendant) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0712712009 11:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to compel arbitration - set PTC & trial 
dates - Def has permission to appear by phone -
Def to rentc hrg to new time 
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/27/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:15 AM: Continued Mtn to compel arbitration -
set PTC & trial dates - Def wants to appear by 
phone - depos in Utah 
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Arbitration **fax** 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03: 19 PM 
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Date Code User Judge 
7/21/2009 MEMO DOOLITTL Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
COmpel Arbitration 
712712009 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 712712009 Time: 11 :33 am 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 0712712009 Jon J. Shindurling 
11:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 Mtn to compel arbitration -
set PTC & trial dates - Def has permission to 
appear by phone - Def to rentc hrg to new time 
712812009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
11/08/2010 10:00 AM) 
HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/29/2010 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearings - PTC set on 11 /8/1 O at 10 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM: JT set on 11/29/10 at 1:30 PM 
ORPT GWALTERS Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial: PTC set Jon J. Shindurling 
on11/8/10 at 10 AM: JT set on 11/29/10 at 1 :30 
PM. (see doc for details). 
ORDR GWALTERS Order Referring Case to Mediation: Ptys to Jon J. Shindurling 
confer/select mediator on/bfr 10/2/09 (see doc for 
details). 
'3012009 ORDR GWALTERS Order: Ds Mtn to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED Jon J. Shindurling 
in part/DENIED in part. Mtn is GRANTED to ext 
that P intends to present any claim in add to the 
claim in its Complaint involving violations of 
"Policy 20" incorporated into the ptys IMEA and 
any such add claims must be submitted to binding 
arbitration. Mtn is DENIED as to any claim 
presented by P arising frm alleged violations by 
ds of "Policy 20" incorporated into the IMEA, as 
such claims are not subject to the ptys arbitration 
agreement. 
)/2009 ANSW KESTER Answer (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
CERT KESTER Certificate Of Service of Defendants' First Set of Jon J. Shindurling 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and 
Requests for Admission (fax) 
12009 MOTN DOOLITTL Motion for Limited Admission Jon J. Shindurling 
/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Order Granting Mtn for Limited Admission: Jon J. Shindurling 
Brinton M. Wilkins be admitted pursuant to ID Bar 
Commission Rule 222 for this matter. 
412009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0912912009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) Mtn for prelim injnctn - Wood to ntc 
5/2009 NOTH KESTER Notice Of Hearing - 9129109@ 1 :30 p.m. Jon J. Shindurling 
MOTN KESTER Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Rule 65) Jon J. Shindurling 
02 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03: 19 PM 
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Certificate of Service of Defendants' Second Set Jon J. Shindurling 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
(fax) 
Amended Notice to Take Deposition Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Travis Jon J. Shindurling 
Garza (fax) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum Pursuant to Jon J. Shindurling 
Idaho R Civ. P. 30(b)(6) of Melaleuca, Inc. 
(fax) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of McKay Jon J. Shindurling 
Christensen (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/28/2009 02:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) Mtn to Continue - Armstrong to ntc 
Notice Of Hearing: re Mtn to continue hrg on P's Jon J. Shindurling 
Mtn for Prelim Injunction set on 9/28/09 at 2 PM 
Motion to Continue Hrg on P's Mtn for Prelim Jon J. Shindurling 
Injunction obo Os. (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/13/2009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) Mtn for Prelim lnjctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 0912912009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for prelim 
injnctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 0912812009 Jon J. Shindurling 
02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Mtn to Continue 
Notice Of Hearing - Amended 10/13/2009 @ Jon J. Shindurling 
1:30 PM 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11 /02/2009 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/13/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01 :30 PM: Continued Mtn for Prelim lnjctn -
Wood to ntc 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/13/2009 01:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/13/2009 
01 :30 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Prelim 
lnjctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11 /23/2009 10:00 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjctn - Wood to ntc - Backup 
date 
Return Of Service - 09126109 (Subpoena for 
Travis Garza) 
Notice Of Service - Discovery Responses 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum 
Pursuant to Idaho R Civ. P. 30 (b)(6) of 
Melaleuca, Inc. 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
Travis Garza 
(\ ') JJ 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03: 19 PM 
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Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, Natalie Foeller 
Date Code User Judge 
10/7/2009 NOTC KESTER Notice Vacating Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
10/15/2009 AFFD LYKE Affidavit Verifying Plaintiffs Responses to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' First Request for Admissions 
NOTC KBAIRD Notice of removal to federal court Jon J. Shindurling 
CDIS GWALTERS Civil Disposition entered for: Foeller, Natalie, Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant; Foeller, Rick, Defendant; Melaleuca, 
Inc., Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/15/2009 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: closed Jon J. Shindurling 
10/16/2009 HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/29/2010 Jon J. Shindurling 
01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Jon J. Shindurling 
11/08/2010 10:00AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 11 /23/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Prelim 
lnjctn - Wood to ntc - Backup date 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 11/02/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Prelim 
lnjctn - Wood to ntc - Backup date 
LYKE Objection to Defendants' First and Second Set of Jon J. Shindurling 
Interrogatories 
NTOS LYKE Notice Of Service - Objections to Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
First and Second Set of Interrogatories; Requests 
for Production and Requests for Admission 
J/29/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/01/2009 10:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjunctn - Wood to ntc 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: Reopened Jon J. Shindurling 
NOTH KESTER Notice Of Hearing - 12/2/09@ 10:00 a.m. Jon J. Shindurling 
)/30/2009 NOTH LYKE Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Preliminary Injunction (12/01/09@10:00AM) 
1312009 MEMO DOOLITTL Memorandum Decision and Order Jon J. Shindurling 
Remanding Federal Court Case back to District 
Court 
DOOLITTL Docket from Federal Court Jon J. Shindurling 
12312009 ORDR GWALTERS Stipulated Protective Order (see doc for details). Jon J. Shindurling 
124/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/15/2009 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjunctn Wood to ntc-
cont'd from 12/1 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 12/01 /2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:00 AM: Continued Mtn for Prelim lnjunctn -
Wood to ntc 
2512009 NOTH WOOLF Notice Of Hearing - Amended 12/15/2009@ Jon J. Shindurling 
9:00AM 
912009 AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong Jon J. Shindurling 04 
Document sealed 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03:19 PM 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
for Preliminary Injunction 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Rick Foeller (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice of Filing Errata to Affidavit of Rick Foeller Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
Plaintiff: Melaleuca, Inc. Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Brent Manning 
Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction 
Document sealed 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Joshua K. Chandler in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Notice Of Appearance of Co-Counsel (Brent V. Jon J. Shindurling 
Manning for Melaleuca, Inc) 
Motion to Strike Affdavit of Joshua K. Chandler Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12/15/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Prelim 
lnjunctn - Wood to ntc - cont'd from 12/1 
Notice Vacating Hearing (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/08/2010 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Prelim lnjunctn - Wood to ntc 
Affidavit of Joshua K. Chandler in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Fax) 
(Only page 1 received on this document) 
Document sealed 
Notice of Filing ERAT A to Affidavit of Joshua K. Jon J. Shindurling 
Chandler in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/06/2010 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for prelim injunctn - Wood to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/08/2010 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Continued Mtn for Prelim lnjunctn -
Wood to ntc 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 4-6-10@ 9:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
a.m. 
Notice Of Appearance of Co-Counsel for Plaintiff Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. - Joshua K. Chandler 
Certificate Of Service of Defendant's 3rd Reqeust Jon J. Shindurling 
for Production of Documents and Things 
(fax) 
Application for Commissions or Letters Rogatory Jon J. Shindurling 
to the Courts of the State of California 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03:19 PM 
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Application for Commissions or Letters Rogatory Jon J. Shindurling 
to the Courts of the State of Georgia 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Application for Commissions or Letters Rogatory Jon J. Shindurling 
to the Courts of the State of Hawaii 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum Jon J. Shindurling 
Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum Jon J. Shindurling 
Commissions or Letters Rogatory to the Courts of Jon J. Shindurling 
the State of Hawaii re Raymond Agren and 
Laraine Agren 
Commissions or Letters Rogatory to the Courts of Jon J. Shindurling 
the State of California re Chuck alimena and 
Cheryl Alimena 
Commissions or Letters Rogatory to the COurts Jon J. Shindurling 
of the State of Georgia re Ledell Miles and 
Gwendolyn Miles 
Notice Vacating Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice Of Service of Plaintiff's First Set of Jon J. Shindurling 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to Defendants Rick and Natalie 
Foeller 
Notice of Continuance of Depositions Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/05/2010 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for prelim injnctn 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/06/2010 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for prelim 
injunctn - Wood to ntc 
Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg RESET to 4/5/10 at 9 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM 
Notice Vacating Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
***Mail Returned for Brent Manning - Notice of Jon J. Shindurling 
Resetting Hearing - Unable to Forward*** 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/05/2010 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for prelim 
injnctn 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Jon J. Shindurling 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
ZARIAN, MIDGLEY, JOHNSON PLLC Receipt 
number: 0018523 Dated: 4/21/2010 Amount: 
$9.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Jon J. Shindurling 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
ZARIAN, MIDGLEY, JOHNSON PLLC Receipt 
number: 0018523 Dated: 4/21/2010 Amount: 
$3.00 (Credit card) 
n (' uv 
>ate: 8/20/2012 
·ime: 03:19 PM 
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/21/2010 QUINTANA Miscellaneous Payment: Mailing/Postage Fee Jon J. Shindurling 
Paid by: ZARIAN, MIDGLEY, JOHNSON PLLC 
Receipt number: 0018523 Dated: 4/21/2010 
Amount: $1.47 (Credit card) 
QUINTANA Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Jon J. Shindurling 
Paid by: ZARIAN, MIDGLEY, JOHNSON PLLC 
Receipt number: 0018523 Dated: 4/21/2010 
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
/10/2010 QUINTANA Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Jon J. Shindurling 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Zarian * Midgley & Johnson PLLC Receipt 
number: 0021408 Dated: 5/10/2010 Amount: 
$133.00 (Credit card) 
QUINTANA Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Jon J. Shindurling 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Zarian * Midgley & Johnson PLLC Receipt 
number: 0021408 Dated: 5/10/2010 Amount: 
$6.00 (Credit card) 
QUINTANA Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Jon J. Shindurling 
Paid by: Zarian * Midgley & Johnson PLLC 
Receipt number: 0021408 Dated: 5/10/2010 
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
117/2010 NOTC TBROWN Notice of Change of Address of Co-Counsel for Pl Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca INC 
'28/2010 MOTN SBARRERA (2) Motion For Order Allowing Out-Of-State Jon J. Shindurling 
Deposition 
'29/2010 SBARRERA (2) Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum Jon J. Shindurling 
1/2010 ORDR GWALTERS Order - Commission Allowing Out of State Jon J. Shindurling 
Deposition re Cheryl Alimena in CA (see doc for 
details) 
ORDR GWALTERS Order - Commission Allowing Out of State Jon J. Shindurling 
Deposition re Chuck Alimena in CA (see doc for 
details) 
9/2010 MOTN LYKE Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Christopher Glauser in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Document sealed 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Joshua K. Chanlder in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Document sealed 
MEMO LYKE Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Summary Judgment 
Document sealed 
12/2010 LYKE Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Jon J. Shindurling 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Thomsen Stephens Receipt number: 0032504 
Dated: 7/12/2010 Amount: $3.00 (Cash) C? 
)ate: 8/20/2012 
rime: 03: 19 PM 
=>age 8 of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002616 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, Natalie Foeller 
)ate Code User 
7/12/2010 LYKE 
'/14/2010 HRSC GWALTERS 
'/16/2010 NOTH LYKE 
'/28/2010 HRSC GWALTERS 
HRVC GWALTERS 
NOTH DOOUTTL 
/22/2010 MEMO SOLIS 
/27/2010 LYKE 
/29/2010 LYKE 
'J/4/2010 MINE GWALTERS 
DCHH GWALTERS 
/1/2010 TRAN GWALTERS 
LYKE 
/1/2010 ORDR GWALTERS 
128/2010 SBARRERA 
Judge 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Jon J. Shindurling 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Thomsen Stephens Receipt number: 0032504 
Dated: 7/12/2010 Amount: $2.00 (Cash) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/02/2010 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for S/J - Chandler to ntc 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Summary Judgment (08/02/10@10:30AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/04/2010 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for S/J - Thomsen Steven to ntc 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/02/201 O 
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for S/J -
Chandler to ntc 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
a.m. 
10-4-10 @ 9:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
For Summary Judgment 
Document sealed 
Reply in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Substitued Declaration of Susan Blazek (Exhibit H Jon J. Shindurling 
to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 10/4/2010 
Time: 9:09 am 
Courtroom: 
Document sealed 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 





Hearing result for Motion held on 10/04/2010 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn for S/J - Thomsen 
Steven to ntc 
Transcript Filed re S/J hrg held bfr Judge 
Shindurling on 10/4/1 o 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Transcript Filed Re: Summary Judgment Motions Jon J. Shindurling 
(October 4, 2010) 
Opinion, Decision, and Order on P's Mtn for S/J: Jon J. Shindurling 
P's mtn for S/J is DENIED. 
Defendants' Request For Rule 16 Scheduling 
Conference 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 8/20/2012 Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville Cou User: LMESSICK 
Time: 03:19 PM ROA Report 
Page 9of15 Case: CV-2009-0002616 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, etal. 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, Natalie Foeller 
Date Code User Judge 
1/4/2011 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
01/24/2011 10:00 AM) set PTC/trial dates 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearing - SIC set 1/24/11 at 10 AM Jon J. Shindurling 
1/21/2011 NOTC LYKE Notice of Association of Co-Counsel for Plaintiff Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc - Ryan D. Nelson 
NOAP LYKE Plaintiff: Melaleuca, Inc. Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Ryan D. Nelson 
1/24/2011 HRHD GWALTERS Hearing result for Status Conference held on Jon J. Shindurling 
01/24/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing Held set 
PTC/trial dates - call Rick at 801-366-1451 
1/25/2011 NOAP GWALTERS Plaintiff: Melaleuca, Inc. Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Joshua K. Chandler 
HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
12/05/2011 10:00 AM) 
HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/19/2011 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearings - PTC set 12/5/11 at 10 AM: Jon J. Shindurling 
JT set 12/19/11 at 1 :30 PM 
ORPT GWALTERS Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial Jon J. Shindurling 
ORDR GWALTERS Order Referring Case to Mediation Jon J. Shindurling 
CERT DOOLITTL Certificate Of Service of Defendants' 3rd Set of Jon J. Shindurling 
Interrogatories and 4th Requests for Production 
(fax) 
NOTC GWALTERS Notice of Association of Co-Counsel for P Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. (re-Ryan Nelson.) 
NOTC GWALTERS Amended Notice of Association of Co-Counsel for Jon J. Shindurling 
P Melaleuca, Inc. re-Ryan Nelson. 
U22/2011 NTOS SOLIS Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Answer To Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Third Set Of Interrogatories And 
Fourth Requests For Production 
'i/4/2011 SBARRERA Certificate Of Service Of Defendants' Fourth Jon J. Shindurling 
Request For Production 
/18/2011 NTOS SBARRERA Notice Of Service- Plaintiffs Responses To Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Fourth Request For Production 
/19/2011 NTOS SOLIS Notice Of Service - OPlaintiffs Supplemental Jon J. Shindurling 
Response To Defendants' Fourth Request For 
Production Of Documents 
'20/2011 MISC LYKE Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure Jon J. Shindurling 
)/12/2011 HRSC GWALTERS HearingScheduled (Motion 11/21/201110:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Reconsideration - Thomsen to ntc 
)/14/2011 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/21/2011 09:30 Jon J. Shindurling (1 .. 
AM) Mtn for S/J -Armstrong to ntc ' j ,_; ' 
)/19/2011 MOTN LYKE Motion for Reconsideration Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO LYKE Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsideration of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
)ate: 8/20/2012 
·ime: 03: 19 PM 
'age iO of 15 
Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville Coun 
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Case: CV-2009-0002616 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, Natalie Foeller 
>ate Code User Judge 
0/19/2011 AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Frank L. Vandersloot in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Reconsideration 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Roger Smith in Support of Plaintiffs Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Reconsideration 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Joshua Chandler in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Reconsideration Jon J. Shindurling 
(11/21/11@10:30AM) 
0/20/2011 MOTN GWALTERS Motion for Summary Judgment (obo Defs) (faxed) Jon J. Shindurling 
0/21/2011 MEMO DOOLITTL Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
for Summary Judgment 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong Jon J. Shindurling 
NOTH DOOLITTL Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Summary Judgment 11-21-11 @ 9:30 a.m. 
1/4/2011 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/21/2011 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to Strike - Armstrong to ntc 
1/7/2011 MOTN SOLIS Motion And Stipulation To Vacate Trial Setting Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO SOLIS Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
SOLIS Plaintiffs Amended Responses To Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Third Set Of Interrogatories 
SOLIS rule 56(f) Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
NTOS SOLIS Notice Of Service - Plaintiffs Amended Jon J. Shindurling 
Responses To Defendants' Third Set Of 
Interrogatories 
/9/2011 MEMO SBARRERA Memorandum In Sopposition To Plaintiffs Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
For Reconsideration Of Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
MOTN SBARRERA Motion To Strike Affidavit Of Roger Smith Jon J. Shindurling 
MOTN SBARRERA Motion To Strike Affidavit Of Joshua Chandler Jon J. Shindurling 
MOTN SBARRERA Motion To Strike Affidavit Of Frank Vandersloot Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO SBARRERA Memorandum In Support Of Motions To Strike Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavits Of Roger Smith, Frank Vandersloot And 
Joshua Chandler 
AFFD SBARRERA Affidavit Of Natalie Foeller Jon J. Shindurling 
AFFD SBARRERA Affidavit Of Richard J. Armstrong In Support Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motions To Strike Affidavits Of Roger Smith, 
Frank Vandersloot, And Joshua Chandler 
NOTH SBARRERA Notice Of Hearing On Defendants' Motion To Jon J. Shindurling 
Strike Affidavits Of Roger Smith, Frank 
Vandersloot And Joshua Chandler ~ .~ ..... iU 
14/2011 MEMO SBARRERA Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion For Summary Judgment And In 
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion 
)ate: 8/20/2012 
rime: 03: 19 PM 
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1/17/2011 MEMO DOOLITTL 
1/21 /2011 MINE GWALTERS 
MINE GWALTERS 
MINE GWALTERS 
Affidavit of Richard R. Friess in Support of 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits 
Affidavit of Joshua K. Chandler in Support of 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Strike The Affidavits of Roger Smith 
Joshua K. Chandler and Frank L. Vandersloot 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motions to 
Stirke Affidavits of Roger Smith, Frank 
Vandersloot, and Joshua Cilandler (fax) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/21/2011 
Time: 9:13 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 







Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/21/2011 
Time: 10:34 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 11/21/2011 
Time: 10:35 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 








Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
11 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03: 19 PM 
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Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1112112011 
Time: 10:36 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 







Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
1112112011 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn for Reconsideration -
Thomsen to ntc 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
1211912011 01:30 PM: Continued 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Jon J. Shindurling 
on 1210512011 10:00 AM: Continued 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
1112112011 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 75 Mtn for SIJ - Armstrong to 
ntc 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
1112112011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 75 Mtn to Strike - Armstrong to 
ntc 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
0110912012 09:00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing - SIC set 119112 at 9 AM 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
0112312012 10:15 AM) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jon J. Shindurling 
on 0110912012 09:00 AM: Continued 
Notice of Hearing - SIC reset to 1123112 at 10:15 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM 
Opinion & Order on P's mtn for Reconsideration: 
P's mtn for reconsideration is GRANTED in their 
favor in amt of $23,856.41 CON. Os' mtn for SIJ 
is DENIED. As the decision does not rely on 
affidavits submitted by Melaleuca in supt of its 
mtn for reconsider, the Os' mtns to strike are 
DENIED. Counsel for P shall prepare an 
appropriate form of judgment. 
Jon J. Shindurling 
)ate: 8/20/2012 Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County User: LMESSICK 
lime: 03: 19 PM ROA Report 
'age 13of15 Case: CV-2009-0002616 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, etal. 
Melaleuca, Inc. vs. Rick Foeller, Natalie Foeller 
)ate Code User Judge 
2/21/2011 NOTC SBARRERA Notice Of Change Of Firm And Address Jon J. Shindurling 
/4/2012 JDMT GWALTERS Judgment & Ntc of Entry: Judgment for P is Jon J. Shindurling 
entered against Defs Rick Foeller and Natalie 
Foeller in amt of $23,856.31 CON w/int at 
statutory rate. (see doc for details). 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jon J. Shindurling 
on 01/23/2012 10:15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
CDIS GWALTERS Civil Disposition entered for: Foeller, Natalie, Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant; Foeller, Rick, Defendant; Melaleuca, 
Inc., Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/4/2012 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: Closed Jon J. Shindurling 
/10/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/2012 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) in supt of fees/costs 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Jon J. Shindurling 
action 
MOTN LYKE Plaintiff's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Fees and Costs 
AFFD LYKE Affidavit of Counsel and Memorandum of Fees Jon J. Shindurling 
and Costs 
AFFD LYKE Attorney Fee Affidavit of Brent V. Manning Jon J. Shindurling 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion and Memorandum Jon J. Shindurling 
in Support of Fees and Costs 
(01/31/12@1 :30PM) 
111/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/14/2012 02:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) in supt of fees/costs - Friess to ntc 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
01/31/2012 01:30 PM: Continued in supt of 
fees/costs 
HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2012 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn in supt of fees/costs - Friess to ntc 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
02/14/2012 02:00 PM: Continued in supt of 
fees/costs - Friess to ntc 
NOTH LYKE Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion and Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Fees and Costs 
(2127 /12@9:00AM) 
17/2012 TRAN SBARRERA Transcript Filed Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO LYKE Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees Jon J. Shindurling 
18/2012 MEMO SOLIS Plaintiff - Verified Memorandum Of Costs and Jon J. Shindurling 
Attorneys' Fees 
BRIF SOLIS Brief In: (1) Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion And Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum Of Costs And Attorneys' Fees 
AFFD SOLIS Affidavit Of Richard J. Armstrong In Support Of Jon J. Shindurling 13 
Memorandum Of Costs And Attorneys' Fees 
5/2012 APDC SOLIS Appeal Filed In Supreme Court (waiting for check Jon J. Shindurling 
from law firm - sent one ck for total amount) 
)ate: 8/20/2012 
lime: 03: 19 PM 
'age 14 of 15 
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U15/2012 SOLIS Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shindurling 
Supreme Court Paid by: Armstrong, Richard J. 
(attorney for Foeller, Rick) Receipt number: 
0009919 Dated: 2/28/2012 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Foeller, Natalie (defendant) and 
Foeller, Rick (defendant) 
APSC LMESSICK Appealed To The Supreme Court Jon J. Shindurling 
~/17/2012 BOULWARE Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Fees and Costs 
AFFD BOULWARE Affidavit of Joshua K. Chandler in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Fees and Costs and Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Fees and Costs 
/23/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/26/2012 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) cont'd - Mtn in supt of fees/costs - Friess to 
ntc 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
02/27/2012 09:00 AM: Continued Mtn in supt of 
fees/costs - Friess to ntc 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion and Memorandum Jon J. Shindurling 
in Support of Fees and Costs 
(03/26/12@11 :OOAM) 
17/2012 BNDC LMESSICK Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11535 Dated Jon J. Shindurling 
3/7/2012 for 100.00) 
CERT AP LMESSICK Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Jon J. Shindurling 
NOTC LYKE Amended Notice of Appeal Jon J. Shindurling 
8/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/09/2012 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for fees/costs - Friess to ntc (cont'd) 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
03/26/2012 11 :00 AM: Continued cont'd - Mtn in 
supt of fees/costs - Friess to ntc 
NOTH DOOLITTL Plaintiffs 3rd Amended Notice Of Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
4-9-12@ 10:30 a.m. 
19/2012 LMESSICK (SC) Notice of Appeal Filed Jon J. Shindurling 
Record Due 5/15/12 
LMESSICK (SC) Clerk's Certificate Filed Jon J. Shindurling 
22/2012 NOTC CEARLY Notice Of Withdrawal Joshua K. Chandler For Jon J. Shindurling 
Meleleuca 
5/2012 MEMO DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Memornadum of Costs and 
Attorney's Fees (fax) 
3/2012 HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
04/09/2012 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for 1 ,J fees/costs - Friess to ntc (cont'd) -:1 
NOTC LYKE Notice Vacating Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 8/20/2012 
Time: 03:19 PM 
Page 15of15 
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Date Code User Judge 
6/15/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07 /03/2012 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to DQ Armstrong - Friess to tnc 
6/20/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/05/2012 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to DQ Armstrong - cont'd by Court 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/03/2012 11 :00 AM: Continued Mtn to DQ 
Armstrong - Friess to tnc 
GWALTERS Notice of Resetting Hearing - Mtn h rg reset to Jon J. Shindurling 
7/5/12 at 9 AM 
MOTN QUINTANA Motion to Seal Jon J. Shindurling 
6/26/2012 NOAP GWALTERS Plaintiff: Melaleuca, Inc. Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
Richard R. Friess 
HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/23/2012 11:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to DQ Armstrong - cont'd by def counsel 
CONT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/05/2012 09:00 AM: Continued Mtn to DQ 
Armstrong - cont'd by Court 
NOTH HUMPHREY Amended Notice Of Hearing 07/23/2012@ Jon J. Shindurling 
11 :OOAM RE: Motion To Disqualify Counsel 
i"/13/2012 NOTC LMESSICK Notice of Balance Due on Clerk's Record Jon J. Shindurling 
7/17/2012 MEMO SBARRERA Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
To Seal And To Disqualify Counsel 
AFFD SBARRERA Affidavit Of Richard J. Armstrong Jon J. Shindurling 
'/19/2012 CEARLY Reply In Support Of Motion To Disqualify Jon J. Shindurling 
'/23/2012 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 7/23/2012 
Time: 11 :36 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 





DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/23/201211:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: nancy marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 Mtn to DQ Armstrong -
cont'd by def counsel 
30/2012 BNDC LMESSICK Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 36677 Dated Jon J. Shindurling 
7/30/2012 for 730.25) 
10/2012 ORDR GWALTERS Opinion & Order on P's Motion to Disqualify: Jon J. Shindurling 
Melaleuca's Motion to Disqualify is GRANTED. 
ORDR GWALTERS Order GRANTING Melaleuca Inc's Motion to Seal Jon J. Shindurling 
1S 
Curt R. Thomsen, Esq., ISB #2072 
T. Jason Wood, Esq., ISB #5016 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
263 5 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW plaintiff Melaleuca, Inc., by and through counsel ofrecord, and for cause of 
action against Defendants, alleges as follows: 
1. Melaleuca, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with its principal place of business in 
Bonneville County, State ofldaho. Bonneville County, State ofldaho is the place of principal injury 
or damage related to the actions of Defendants therein. 
1 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRJAL 
2. Defendants Rick and Natalie Foeller are residents of Ontario, Canada. 
3. Defendants have maintained business contacts with the State ofidaho, out of which 
arise of operative facts pertaining to the present action, have contracted with Melaleuca, Inc., in the 
State ofldaho, have been trained in the State ofldaho, and have sent money to and received products 
and substantial commissions from the State of Idaho. Defendants are therefore personally subject 
to jurisdiction of the courts of the State ofldaho pursuant to Idaho Code §5-514 and the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
4. Defendants have committed tortious acts directed at Melaleuca, Inc., in the State of 
Idaho, and have intended to and have caused damage to Melaleuca, Inc., in the State of Idaho. 
Defendants are subject to jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Idaho for this additional reason, 
pursuant to Idaho Code §5-514 and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
5. Defendants have expressly consented to personal jurisdiction by the Courts of the 
State of Idaho over disputes such as this one, which tum on violations of Melaleuca's contractual 
prohibition against Marketing Executives recruiting Melaleuca Customers for another business. 
6. On or about September 15, 1999, Defendants entered into an Independent Marketing 
Executive Agreement (IMEA) with Melaleuca, Inc., and Defendants functioned thereafter as 
independent contractors acting through the agreement with Melaleuca, Inc. Defendants agreed to 
comply with and honor the IMEA terms and conditions, as well as Policies, as they were in 
existence, and as further amended, both during their relationship with Melaleuca, and, with respect 
to some Policies, after any termination of the Independent Marketing Executive Agreement 
relationship. 
2 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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7. In November 2008, Defendants terminated their IMEA. Shortly thereafter, Melaleuca 
notified Defendants that they had violated the terms and conditions of that agreement. The activities 
of Defendants before and since November 2008 have been directed at Melaleuca, Inc., with the intent 
to interfere with Melaleuca, Inc.'s agreements with its other Independent Marketing Executives 
(IME's) and/or Customers. 
8. Defendants have, in violation of their agreements, and in violation of controlling law, 
used confidential and proprietary business information and trade secrets in an effort to raid their 
former business organization's IME's and Customers and to persuade those persons to leave 
Melaleuca and go to their new business in Max International ("Max"). Defendants willfully violated 
the policies of Melaleuca, Inc., in their activities, including Policy 20, concerning non-solicitation 
of Melaleuca Marketing Executives and Customers, and policies prohibiting the use and 
dissemination of confidential and proprietary information, and intentionally and tortiously interfered 
with Melaleuca, Inc.'s agreements with other Melaleuca IME's and/or Customers. 
9. The actions of Defendants have caused, and will continue in the future to cause, iajury 
and damage to Melaleuca, Inc.'s business and will result in loss, damage or other effects as intended 
by Defendants. Melaleuca, Inc., is entitled to recover from Defendants all past and future costs, 
damages, and losses incurred as a result of the improper actions of Defendants, in an amount to be 
proven at the time of trial or at the time judgment is requested. 
10. The amount in controversy is in excess of $10,000, and is otherwise sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction in the District Court and not the Magistrate's Division of the District Court. 
3 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
11. Melaleuca, Inc., is further entitled to an order from this Court enjoining Defendants 
from violating their agreements with Melaleuca, Inc., to include actions in recruiting Melaleuca 
independent Marketing Executives, clients and Customers in contravention of their agreements. The 
actions of Defendants have caused, and will in the future cause, irreparable injury and harm to 
Plaintiff. 
12. Melaleuca, Inc., is further entitled to recover its attorney fees and court costs incurred 
therein in prosecuting this action pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120 and 121, and per the 
controlling agreements. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffMelaleuca, Inc. requests the judgment, order and decree of this court 
against Defendants, as follows: 
1. For judgment against Defendants for past and future costs, losses and damages 
sustained by Melaleuca, Inc., as a result of the improper and unlawful actions identified above; 
2. For a preliminary and permanent injunction directing Defendants to cease and desist 
from raiding Melaleuca independent Marketing Executives, clients and Customers, for the time 
periods agreed by Defendants, which time period should begin to run from the time of judgment in 
order to give Melaleuca the compliance agreed, for the time period agreed, without violation; 
3. For an award of Plaintiff's attorney fees; 
4. For an award of Plaintiff's cost of suit incurred therein; 
5. Plaintiff reserves the right to seek punitive damages under the provisions of Idaho 
statute by subsequent motion and order; and 
4 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
6. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2009. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff Melaleuca, Inc., requests trial by jury of not less than 12 persons as to all issues 
triable to a jury in this matter. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2009. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
5 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
from:foeller, Rick and H 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard J. Armstrong ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
rjannstrong@woodcrapo.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
801 366 6061 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
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Defendants Rick Foeller and Natalie Foeller (collectively, "Defendants"), answer 
the enumerated paragraphs of Plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
I. Admit that Melaleuca, Inc., is an Idaho corporation with its principal place 
of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. Defendants deny any allegation or implication that 
their actions have injured Plaintiff in any way and, therefore, deny the second sentence. 
2. Admit. 
3. Admit that Defendants have maintained business contacts with the State of 
Idaho; have contracted with Melaleuca, Inc., in the State ofldaho; have been trained in the State 
From:Foeller, Rick and H 801 366 6061 oa1or 10s 13:53 tt443 P.005/008 
of Idaho; and have sent money to and received products and commissions from the State of 
Idaho. Deny that they have, or any implication that they have, engaged in any actions justifying 
or providing a legal or factual basis for Plaintiff's claims, or that they have received "substantial" 
commissions. Admit that Defendants are personally subject to the jurisdiction of Idaho courts. 
Deny all other allegations not expressly admitted. 
4. Deny. 
5. Admit. 
6. Defendants deny any implication that they have not fully complied with all 
obligations imposed upon them by their IMEA and/or Melaleuca's applicable policies, but 
otherwise admit paragraph 6. 
7. Admit that Defendants terminated their IMEA in November 2008 and that 
shortly thereafter Melaleuca informed Defendants that Melaleuca believed Defendants had 







Defendants deny generally and specifically each and every allegation set forth in 
the Complaint not expressly admitted herein, including all allegations set forth in the associated 
prayer for relief. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is the breaching party. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff changed its compensation plan. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Accord and satisfaction, payment, release and any other defense available lll1der 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( c ). 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Waiver, estoppel, and unclean hands. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants reserve the right to assert additional affirmative defenses which may 
arise as discovery progresses or otherwise in the course of this litigation. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's policies and procedures violate public policy and are otherwise too 
broad and act as an unreasonable restrain on trade. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff enforces and applies its policies and procedures in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendants request that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed, that it 
take nothing thereby, that Defendants be awarded their costs and attorneys' fees and for such 
other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
By...._-=o.-~-t-_...--.......,,_ ___ ""'--~=-~~~~ 
Richar J. 
60 E. S uth T 
Salt Lake City, tah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
rjarmstrong@woodcrapo.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the e11 day of August, 2009, I caused to be mailed in 
the United States mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to the following: 
Curt R. Thomsen 
T. Jason Wood 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
S:\WPDAT A \PLEADING\FOELLER.MELALEUCAANSWER.wpd 
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Curt R. Thomsen, Esq., ISB #2072 
T. Jason Wood, Esq., ISB #5016 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone (208) 522-1230 
Fax (208) 522-1277 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RICK FOELLER and NATALIE FOELLER,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-09-2616 
Based upon the stipulation of Melaleuca, Inc., Rick and Natalie Foeller and Max 
International, LLC (collectively, the "Parties") for entry of a protective order, and good cause 
appearing, the Court herein enters the following Protective Order: 
1. DEFINITIONS 
1.1 "Material" refers to any document, data compilation, testimony, or other inf01mation 
in any form produced or disclosed in this action (including copies), whether 
voluntarily or through any means of discovery authorized by law, and whether by a 
party or non-party. 
1.2 Material may be designated "CONFIDENTIAL" if the Designating Party in good 
faith believes that disclosure of such Material in this case without the designation 
may present a risk of injury to the legitimate business interests of the Disclosing 
Party or any other legitimate interest. Confidential information includes, but is not 
limited to, trade secrets (as trade secrets are defined by the ~nifo Trade 
.:r .I"' I. C7 
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Secrets Act, Utah Code ~. §§ 13"24=1, et"s • , all Materials reflecting, referring 
to or evidencing any information deemed confidential by any local, state, or federal 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or other law, business plans or forecasts, financial 
plans and forecasts, operational plans and forecasts, and all private or sensitive 
commercial, financial, personal or personnel, underwriting, rating, claims and 
insurance policy infonnation. Confidential information may take the form of, but is 
not limited to, (a) documents, interrogatories, requests for admission, and answers 
thereto; (b) hearing or deposition transcripts and related exhibits; and (c) all copies, 
abstracts, excerpts, analyses, and complete or partial summaries prepared from or 
containing, reflecting, or disclosing such confidential information. 
1.3 A party may also designate Material as "SENSITIVE. 11 SENSITIVE Material must 
meet the CONFIDENTIAL designation requirements of Section 1.2 and must be so 
proprietary or competitively sensitive that its disclosure to persons other than those 
enumerated in Section 4.1.7 below could cause irreparable competitive or other 
injury to one of the parties or to a competitor of one of the parties (for instance, by 
giving one of the parties a competitive advantage). 
1.4 "Disclosing Party" refers to a party or non-party to this action' who produces Material. 
1.5 "Designating Party" refers to a party or non-party to this action who designates 
Material as CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE. 
1.6 11Requesting Party" refers to a party who has made a discovery request. 
1.7 "Receiving Party" refers to a party who receives Material. 
2. SCOPE OF PROTECTIVE ORDER 
2 .1 Except as the parties may otherwise agree or the Court may order, Material produced, 
whether or not designated CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE, including any excerpt, 
analysis, summary, or description of it, shall be used solely for the prosecution or 
defense of the above action captioned Melaleuca, Inc. v. Rick and Natalie Foeller, 
pending in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State ofidaho, in and 
for the County of Bonneville, Case No. CV-09-2616 (the "Idaho Case11), including 
appeals, and in the miscellaneous action captioned Melaleuca, Inc. v. Rick and 
Natalie Foeller pending in the Third Judicial District of the Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Case No. 090915350 ("the Utah Case") including appeals. If 
CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE materials are used in either the Idaho Case or the 
Utah Case, they must be used without violation of this Stipulated Protective Order. 
2.2 This Order shall govern all Material produced in this action, including Material 
produced prior to entry of this Order, and all Material produced in this action that is 
used in the Utah Case. 
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2.3 The protections of this Order shall not apply to Material that, prior to disclosure in 
this action, was within the actual possession or knowledge of a Receiving Party but 
was not subject to any confidentiality obligation between the parties, or was actually 
public knowledge, provided that the Material did not become public knowledge 
through an act or omission of a Receiving Party. However, Material that was in t.1.e 
hands of the Receiving Party prior to disclosure in this action and that was subject 
to a confidentiality obligation between the parties shall be made subject to this Order. 
Any party who claims that the Material was, prior to disclosure in this action, ·within 
its actual possession or knowledge and was not subject to a confidentiality obligation 
or was public knowledge shall have the burden of proving ~he fact. 
3. DESIGNATION OF MATERIAL AS CONFIDENTIAL 
3 .1 General Provisions 
3.1.l A Disclosing Party may designate Material as CONFIDENTIAL or 
SENSITIVE only if the Material (1) is CONFIDENTIAL, as defined by 
Section 1.2, or SENSITIVE, as defined by Section 1.3; and (2) is not 
excluded from the scope of this Order by Section 2.3. 
3 .1.2 The Disclosing Party's failure to designate Material as CONFIDENTIAL or 
SENSITIVE at the time of production or disclosure of the Material does not 
waive its right later to designate the Material as CONFIDENTIAL or 
SENSITIVE. After any designation, each Receiving Party shall treat the 
designated Material as either CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE and subject 
to the protections of this Order. 
3.2 Methods of Designation 
3 .2.1 A Disclosing Party may designate Material as CONFIDENTIAL by placing 
or affixing on the Material the word "CONFIDENTIAL11 and/or "SUBJECT 
TO PROTECTIVE ORDER" or a similar legend. If a Disclosing Party 
chooses not to mark every page, the use of envelopes, binders, or containers 
to house the Materials which are marked CONFIDENTIAL is acceptable, as 
is the clear designation of groupings of documents. 
3 .2.2 A Disclosing Party may designate Material as SENSITIVE by placing or 
affixing on the Material the word "SENSITIVE" and/or "SUBJECT TO 
PROTECTIVE ORDER" or asimilar legend, including "ATTORNEY EYES 
ONLY." If a Disclosing Party chooses not to mark every page, the use of 
envelopes, binders, or containers to house the Materials which are marked 
SENSITIVE is acceptable, as is the clear desigilation of groupings of 
documents. 
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3.2.3 Hearing or deposition transcripts, or portions of such transcripts, may be 
designated CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE by counsel so stating on the 
record during the hearing or deposition or 'Within 10 days of receipt of the 
written transcript. 
3 .2.4 When CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE Material is supplied or stored on an 
electromagnetic medium, the CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE designation 
shall be made, to the extent physically possible, on the medium itself (such 
as on a label attached to a disk), on the sleeve, envelope, box, or other 
container or such medium. 
3 .3 Challenging Coniidentiality Designations 
3 .3 .1 A Receiving Party may chfillenge the coniidentiality designation by motion. 
The Designating Party bears the burden of proving that the challenged 
Material is CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE under Sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
The challenging party bears the burden of proving that the challenged 
Material is excluded from the scope of this Order or was acquired or 
developed independently by the Receiving Party. The challenged Material 
shall be treated as CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE pending a ruling on the 
motion. · 
4. DISCLOSURE. USE, AND HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL OR SENSITIYE 
MATERIAL 
4-
4.1 U§e and Handling of CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE Material 
4.1.1 To the extent any Material filed with the Court, including pleadings, exhibits, 
transcripts, answers to interrogatories, transcripts of hearings or depositions, 
and responses to requests for admissions, contains or reveals 
CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE Material, the Material or any portion 
thereof shall be filed under seal. 
4.1.2 All copies, duplicates, extracts, summaries, or descriptions (collectively 
"copies") of Materials designated as CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE, or 
any portion thereof, shall immediately be affixed with the word 
"CONFIDENTIAL,11 or "SENSITIVE" if such a word does not already 
appear. 
4.1.3 Material designated as CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE shall not be posted 
on the Internet, except to the limited extent such materials are made available 
for review through an Electronic Case Filing system provided by the Court. 
4.1.4 Material designated CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE does not lose protected 
status through an unauthorized disclosure, whether intentional or inadvertent, 
by a Receiving Party. If such a disclosure occurs, the parties shall take all 
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 29 
5 -
steps reasonably required to assure the continued confidentiality of the 
Material. 
4.1.5 Material that is subject to a claim of attorney/client privilege or to work 
product protection by the disclosing party does not lose its protected status 
through disclosure to the receiving party and disclosure of such Material does 
not constitute a waiver of a claim of privilege by the disclosing party. If 
Material is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of 
protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify 
any party that received the Material of the claim and the basis for it. After 
being notified, a party must promptly return or sequester the specified 
Material and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information 
until the question of its privileged or protected status is determined. If a 
receiving party challenges the privilege designation, the receiving party must 
sequester the Material and promptly present the Material to the court under 
seal for a determination of the asserted privilege claim. If the receiving party 
disclosed the infonnation before being notified,-itmust-take immediate and 
reasonable steps to retrieve it. The disclosing party must preserve the 
infonnation until the claim is resolved. 
4.1.6 Any Material that is designated CONFIDENTIAL shall not be disclosed to 
any person or entity other than the following, and only after such person or 
entity has been advised of and is subject to the terms of this Order: 
4.1.6.l The parties, including in-house counsel, former officers, d~ectors, 
partners, employees, or agents of a party required to provide 
assistance in the conduct of the litigation, or in related criminal 
actions. 
4.1.6.2 The Court and its staff; 
4.1.6.3 Outside counsel of record for the parties in this litigation; 
4.1.6.4 Members of the legal, paralegal, secretarial or clerical staff of such 
counsel who are assisting in or responsible for working on this 
litigation; 
4 .1.6 .5 Outside consultants, investigators or experts (collectively, 11 experts") 
of the parties; 
4.1.6.6 Court reporters during depositions or hearings; 
4.1.6.7 Deponents during depositions or witnesses during hearings; 
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4.1.6.8 Persons who have had, or wlJ_om any counsel for any party in good 
faith believes to have had, prior access to the CONFIDENTIAL 
Material being disclosed, or who have been participants in a 
communication that is the subject of the CONFIDENTIAL Material 
and from whom verification of or other information about L1.at access 
or participation is sought, solely to the extent of disclosing such 
information to which they have or may have ·had access or that is the 
subject of the communication in which they have or may have 
participated, except that, unless and until counsel confirms that any 
such persons have had access or were participants, only as much of 
the information may be disclosed as may be necessary to confirm the 
person's access or participation; and 
4.1.6.9 Employees of third-party contractors of the parties involved solely in 
providing copying services or litigation support services such as 
organizing, filing, coding, converting, storing, or retrieving Material 
connected with this action. 
4.1.7 Any Material that is designated SENSITIVE shall not be disclosed to any 
person or entity other than the following, and only after such person oi: entity 
has been advised of and is subject to the terms of this Order: 
4.1.7.1 The Court and its staff; 
4.1.7.2 Outside counsel of record for the parties in this litigation; 
4.1.7.3 Members of the legal, paralegal, secretarial or clerical staff qf such 
outside counsel who are assisting in or responsible for working on 
this litigation; 
4.1.7.4 Experts of the parties; 
4.1. 7 .5 Court reporters during depositions or hearings; 
4.1. 7 .6 Deponents during depositions or witnesses during hearings; . 
4.1.7.7 Persons who have had, or whom any counsel for any party in good 
faith believes to have had, prior access to the SENSITIVE Material 
being disclosed, or who have been participants in a communication 
that is the subject of the SENSITIVE Material and from whom 
verification of or other information about that access or participation 
is sought, solely to the extent of disclosing such information to which 
they have or may have had access or that is the subject ·of the 
. communication in which they have or may hav.e participated, except 
that, unless and until counsel confirms that any such persons have had 
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access or were participants, only as much of the information may be 
disclosed as may be necessary to confirm the person's access or 
participation; and 
4.1. 7 .8 Employees of third-party contractors of the parties involved solely in 
providing copying services or litigation support services such as 
organizing, filing, coding, converting, storing, or retrieving Material 
connected with this action. 
4.1.8 Prior to disclosure of any CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE Material to any 
expert employed by the parties or counsel for the' parties to assist in the 
preparation and litigation of this matter, he or she must first be advised of and 
agree in writing to be bound by the provisions of this Order. Such written 
agreement may consist of his or her endorsement of a copy of this Order. 
Copies of such "Wl'itings, except as to those persons whose identities need not 
be disclosed in discovery, shall be produced to other parties upon Written 
request. 
5. OTHER PROVISIONS 
7 -
5.1 At the conclusion of the litigation and the Idaho Case, including any appeal, all 
Material not received in evidence shall be returned to the Disclosing Party. If the 
Disclosing Party agrees in "W!'iting, the Material may be destroyed. 
5.2 Any third party producing Materials in this action may be included in this Order by 
endorsing a copy of this Order and delivering it to the Requesting Party, who, in turn, 
will serve it upon counsel for the other parties. 
5 .3 This Order shall not prevent any party from applying to the Court for further or 
additional protective orders, or from agreeing with the other parties to modify this 
Order, subject to the approval of the Court. 
5 .4 This Order shall not preclude any party from enforcing its rights against any other 
party, or any non-party, believed to be violating its rights under this Order. 
5.5 Except as provided for in this Order, nothing in this Order, nor any actions taken 
pursuant to this Order, shall be deemed to have the effect of an admission or waiver 
by any party, including the right of either party to object to the subject matter of any 
discovery request Furthermore, nothing in this Order, nor any actions taken pursuant 
to or under the provisions of this Order shall have the effect of proving, suggesting 
to prove, or otherwise creating a presumption that information disclosed in this action 
is confidential, trade secret or proprietary, as it pertains to the parties' respective 
claims in this action. 
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5. 6 After final termination of this litigation, including any appeal, each counsel of record, 
upon written request made within 60 days of the date of final termination, shall 
within 60 days of such request, (a) destroy or (b) assemble and return to the .counsel 
of record, all Material in their possession and control, embodying information 
designated CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITIVE, includfog all copies thereof except that 
each counsel of record may maintain one archive copy of all pleadings, 
correspondence, deposition transcripts, deposition exhibits, trial transcripts, and trial 
exhibits, together with any attorney work product provided that such archive copy be 
appropriately marked as CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITNE and be retained in 
accordance with the terms of this Order. 
5.7 Counsel for any party may exclude from the room at a deposition, other discovery 
proceedings or at a hearing, during any questioning that involves CONFIDENTIAL 
or SENSITIVE Material, any person (other than the witness then testifying) who is 
not permitted the disclosure of such Material under this Order. 
5.8 Nothing in this Order shall bar or otherwise restrict any attorney of record from 
rendering advice to his or her client with respect to this litigation and, in the course 
thereof, from referring to or relying in a general way upon his or her examination of 
any CONFIDENTIAL or SENSITNE Material; provided, however, that in rendering 
such advice and in otherwise communicating with his or her client, the attorney shall 
make no disclosure of the contents or the source of any CONFIDENTIAL or 
SENSITNE Material if such disclosure would be contrary to the terms of this Order. 
SO ORDERED this (!ja_ay of f\f ~ 2009. . 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
STIPULATED AND AGREED: 
Dated this_ day of _____ _, 2009. 
R:iek Foeller 
8 - STlPULA TED PROTECTIVE ORDER 33 
Dated this /Jtay of tJc./t>/1#"' , 2009. 
Dated this Caay of~ 2009. THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES 
Dated this J day of ~6- 2009. P~4LA~. 
/ ~?U/ ~eY/N~t£WTI 
Erik A. Christiansen 
Attorneys for Max International, LLC 
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UNDERTAKING 
I, ______________ , have read and agree to be bound by the Protective 
Order in Melaleuca, Inc. v. Rick Foeller and Natalie Foeller. 
J:\data\TJW\4550-021\l'LEADINGS\Ol 0 Stipulated Protective Order.wpd 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am the duly elected and qualified Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville; that I served a copy of 
the foregoing STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER to the following attorneys this J3_ day 
of NO\Jel'!l.b::J2009, as follows: 
CURT R THOMSEN 
T JASON WOOD 
2635 CHANNING WAY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
ERIK A CHRISTENSEN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Clerk 
[x] Courthouse Box 
[x] U.S. Mail 
[x] U.S. Mail 
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James R. Holman, Esq., ISB # 2547 
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no genuine issue of material fact for trial and Melaleuca is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this L day of July, 2010 
':, Brent . a ng 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Melaleuca, Inc. ("Plaintiff' or 
"Melaleuca") hereby submits this Reply ("Reply") in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion") in the above-captioned matter. For the reasons set forth herein, there is 
no genuine issue of material fact for trial and Melaleuca is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
INTRODUCTION 
In their Opposition ("Opp.") Defendants do not contest that they violated Policy 20 by 
enrolling Melaleuca Customers into Max International. Defendants also concede that under the plain 
terms of the Independent Marketing Executive Agreement ("IMEA"), they are therefore required to 
return to Melaleuca the commissions Melaleuca paid them "for and after" the calendar month in 
which their first violation took place. They contend, however, that Melaleuca is not entitled to 
recover the commissions it wrongly paid them, because Policy 20( c )(1) (the provision which 
provides for recovery) is unenforceable as a "liquidated damages" provision that bears no reasonable 
relationship to the damages suffered by Melaleuca, and the "liquidated damages" for which it 
supposedly provides were not properly pleaded. 
Defendants' claims fail, for three independent reasons. First, Policy 20(c)(l) is not a 
liquidated damages provision because the policy does not set forth a dollar amount, estimated in 
advance, that Defendants will owe regardless of the actual facts. Policy 20( c )(1) states only that 
whatever commissions Melaleuca wrongly paid Defendants after Defendants resigned by violating 
Policy 20 are recoverable under the agreement. The amount could be zero, or it could be 
millions-but it will always be what was actually paid, and not some other number. 
Defendants do not and cannot dispute that Melaleuca was actually harmed when it paid 
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commissions to which Defendants were not entitled. The amount of this harm does not need to be 
estimated-it is known, because the total amount of these commissions is known. 1 Whether or not 
Melaleuca suffered any additional harms, such as the other potential harms identified (and 
discounted) by Defendants in their briefs and affidavits, is irrelevant. Because the amount of the 
damages under Policy 20(c)(l) depends upon the actual facts, and is not a fixed estimate made in 
advance, it is not a liquidated damages provision. 
Second, even if one were to term Policy 20( c )(1) a "liquidated damages" provision, it would 
still be valid and enforceable. Defendants are of course right that there is no necessary relationship 
between the total commissions wrongfully paid to Defendants and the other potential harms for 
which Melaleuca could have (but has not) sought recovery. But that fact is irrelevant. As to the 
harms for which Melaleuca is seeking compensation, there is an exact, one-to-one relationship 
between the harm suffered and the damages sought. Whatever the outer limits of the "reasonable 
relationship" test, a 100% correspondence between the damages provided for in the contract and the 
harm suffered by Melaleuca is enough to fall within them. Policy 20( c )(1) is enforceable, whether 
as a liquidated damages clause or otherwise. 
Third, Defendants' contention that these wrongfully paid comm1ss10ns are "special 
damages" that had to be set forth specifically in the complaint fails because the contract itself 
provides for recovery of these damages. Defendants have no claim to "surprise"-they are presumed 
to have read the contractual provision they are accused of violating. 
1 Plaintiff acknowledges that (as set forth in the Opposition Brief) it appears that Melaleuca's belief that Tracy Leigh was 
recruited in violation of Policy 20 was the result ofa clerical error. Accordingly, the total award on summary judgment 
should be reduced to $23,855.81 CDN from $31,860.04 CDN, to exclude the commission and bonus check received by 
Defendants for June 2008 from the calculation. 
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"Special damages," by contrast, "are damages that are unusual for the type of claim in 
question." LINC Fin. C01p. v. Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 922 (7th Cir. 1997) (applyingF.R.C.P. 9(g) 
and holding that "[ c ]ertainly the award of [certain damages] is not 'special' in this case, where all 
three are specifically provided for in the lease agreement upon which the suit was based"). The only 
"purpose of requiring that special damages be specifically pleaded is to put a defendant on notice that 
damages other than those which he is presumed to expect are being sought." Diaz Irizarry v. 
Erznia, N. V, 678 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D.P.R. 1988) (applying F.R.C.P 9(g) to contract claim and 
finding that normal contract damages are not "special damages" for pleading purposes) (emphasis 
added). Defendants had only to read Policy 20 to discover that Melaleuca was seeking recovery of 
inter alia, wrongfully paid commissions. 
This case could not be simpler. No fact of any consequence is in dispute. Melaleuca paid 
commissions to Defendants in the belief that Defendants were performing their obligations under 
Policy 20. Defendants concede that they were not so performing. Melaleuca now asks for its money 
back-a right the agreement (again, concededly) bestows upon the company. This Court should 
enforce the agreement and enter summary judgment for Melaleuca. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IRCP 56(c); G & M Farms v. 
Fund Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17 (1991 ); Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587, 
590 (Ct. App. 1994). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but ... must set 
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forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IRCP 56(e); see also Chandler 
v. Hayden, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (Idaho 2009). 
Only reasonable factual inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g. 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852 (Ct. App. 1986) (nonmovant only entitled to 
inferences "drawn reasonably from the underlying facts"). Moreover, to avoid summary judgment 
"specific facts" must be shown that do more than create a "slight doubt" as to whether there is "a 
genuine issue for trial." Marchand v. Jem Sportwear, Inc., 143 Idaho 458 (2006). Instead, the 
evidence must be substantial enough that a jury could rely upon it without speculation or conjecture 
to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Pena v. Minidoka County, 133 Idaho 222, 225 
(1999) (noting that "[t]he non-moving party's case ... must be anchored in something more than 
speculation"); Smith v. Praegitzer, 114 Idaho 14 7, 149 (Idaho 1988) (rejecting inference on summary 
judgment because "[i]t is well established that an inference would be unreasonable ifit would permit 
a jury to base its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Policy 20(c)(l) Is Not a "Liquidated Damages" Provision 
Defendants argue that Policy 20( c )(1) is a "liquidated damages" provision. However, under Idaho 
law, a provision is a "liquidated damages" provision only when the Parties "agree in advance to the 
amount of damages in case of breach." Intermountain Eye & Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C v. lvfiller, 142 
Idaho 218, 224 (2005) (declining to decide whether non-compete clause requiring payment of a sum 
certain by doctor in the event that he competed after leaving the plaintiffs' practice was a liquidated 
damages clause, but analyzing it as part of a "non-compete" provision instead of as a liquidated 
damages clause). 
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Policy 20( c )( 1) contains no reference to any "amount" of damages. The amount of the 
damages under the policy could be zero or it could be a substantial number, depending on the actual 
commissions paid to the offending party for and after the month of his or her first violation. No 
attempt is made in the Policy to estimate or agree in advance on any particular amount.2 
Instead of an agreement in advance to an "amount" of damages, Policy 20( c )( 1) simply makes 
certain damages-reliance damages in the form of commissions paid by Melaleuca in the belief that 
Defendants were performing-recoverable under the contract, rather than solely through a separate 
action for fraud or unjust enrichment. As Melaleuca' s Motion pointed out, the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 349 explicitly provides that this measure of damages may be 
used--even when there is no agreement provision allowing it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS, § 349 ("the injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including 
expenditures made in preparation for performance or in perfonnance"). Here the policy reasons 
underlying the Restatement rule apply with even more force, because an explicit agreement permits 
recovery of these damages. 3 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "liquidated damages" in the context of awarding prejudgment interest, 
stating that "when damages are not readily ascertainable prior to the proceedings on remand, they are not liquidated." 
Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 763 (1999). Applying this analysis, Policy 20(c)(l) is 
not a liquidated damages provision because it does not make the damages "readily ascertainable" prior to the breach. 
Until the Foellers breached Policy 20 and then continued to receive and cash commission and bonus checks, neither 
party could "readily ascertain" what, if any, damages would be recoverable by Melaleuca under Policy 20( c )(! ). 
3 In this respect, this case is indistinguishable from Afton Energy v. Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333, 339 (1992), a 
case in which the contract provided "specific remed[ies] for breach" that were unique and complicated. See id. 
(enforcing an agreement that permitted, inter alia, the "recover[y by the counterclaimant of] the amount of its 
overpayment" in certain circumstances, and to "permanently reduce or stop future payments" in others as remedies 
for breach). Defendants agree that "the remedy provisions at issue in Afton ... are not liquidated damages 
provisions," (Opp. at 16) but do not offer any meaningful distinction between those provisions and Policy 20(c)(l). 
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Each of Defendants' cases is distinguishable from this case because in each of their cases a 
specific amount of money, agreed upon in advance, was involved. See, e.g. Graves v. Cupic, 75 
Idaho 451, 456 (1954) (contract provided for specific payments and provided that those payments 
(totaling $14,500) would be "liquidated damages" in the event of a "cancellation") (cited in Opp. at 
11); Seraphin v. SBC Internet Servs., Inc., CV 09-131-S-REB, 2010 WL 1326820, at *5 (D. Idaho 
Mar. 29, 2010) ($200 "cancellation fee" was "liquidated damages") (cited in Opp. at 11). In none 
of Defendants' cases did a court declare a provision that did not "fix[] by certain agreement" "the 
amount of compensation to be paid in the event of a breach of contract" to be a liquidated damages 
clause. Chodos v. West Publishing, 292 F.3d 992, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining "liquidated 
damages) (cited in Opp. at 11). 
Moreover, while Defendants spend considerable effort characterizing Policy 20( c )(1) as a 
"forfeiture" provision-at one point even cryptically referring to it as a "double-whammy forfeiture" 
(Opp. at 12) it is Defendants, not Plaintiff, who seek a forfeiture in this case. A "forfeiture" is "the 
divestiture of property without compensation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (7th Ed. 1999). In 
the cases cited by Defendants, the injured party sought to keep money paid to it by the breaching 
party while withholding the perfonnance (in the form of services or property) for which the money 
was originally paid. See Graves, 7 5 Idaho at 456 ( counterclaimants sought to keep $14,500 paid to 
them under the agreement and to retain possession of the property for which that sum had been 
intended to be partial payment); Seraphin, 2010 WL 1326820, at* 5 (internet service provider sought 
to charge $200 "cancellation fee" and to be excused from providing any further services). 
Defendants' position is that, notwithstanding the fact that, as they concede, they withheld 
performance under Policy 20, they should be permitted to keep the commissions Melaleuca paid 
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them for that performance. In other words, Defendants contend that Melaleuca should forfeit the 
commissions it wrongly paid them. As Defendants point out, "equity abhors [such] forfeitures" 
(Opp. at 13) and Defendants should be required to return the commissions to which they concede 
they were not entitled. 
Defendants have pointed to no linguistic ambiguity in the text of Policy 20 that could create 
an issue of fact. As a result this case falls under the general rule that the "interpretation and legal 
effect [of a contract] are questions oflaw." Intermountain Eye, l 42 Idaho at 222. Accordingly, this 
case is ripe for decision, and the Court should award summary judgment to Melaleuca. 
II. Policy 20(c)(l) Is Not a Penalty 
Defendants contend that Policy 20( c )(1) is unenforceable as a penalty. Defendants are wrong 
because Policy 20( c )(1) only requires them to return commissions to which they had no right in the 
first place-the amount they must pay is the amount they wrongly received, not an arbitrary amount 
agreed-upon by the parties in advance. 
The test of whether or not a liquidated damages provision may be enforced is two-fold: (1) 
the "actual damages ... [must be] difficult or impossible to detem1ine;" and (2) "the amount of the 
liquidated damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages anticipated to be 
incurred." Margaret H Wayne Trustv. Lipsly, 123 Idaho 253, 258-59 (1993). Defendants contend 
that Policy 20( c )(1) fails these two tests because (1) Melaleuca' s 3 O(b )( 6) witness stated that the 
company was going to hire an expert to help calculate damages (suggesting to Defendants that doing 
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so is not impossible); and (2) the "open-ended amount of liquidated damages[4] under Policy 20 
bears no reasonable relationship to the actual damages anticipated to be incurred." Opp. at 14. 
Defendants' argument makes one crucial error-it only addresses Melaleuca' s damages other 
than the payments that Defendants wrongfully received from the company. Policy 20( c )(1) itself 
takes the opposite approach-it addresses only the damages Melaleuca suffered by virtue of having 
wrongly paid commissions to Policy 20 violators. Only by excluding from the analysis the damages 
Policy 20( c )(1) was meant to address and including instead damages which are plainly outside its 
scope are Defendants able to come to the conclusion that Policy 20( c )(1) imposes a "penalty" that 
"bears no reasonable relationship" to Melaleuca's actual damages. 
The reality is that Policy 20( c )(1) not only "bears a reasonable relationship" to Melaleuca' s 
actual damages-it exactly corresponds to the actual damages it is meant to measure. Accordingly, 
it cannot be a penalty, and Plaintiff's motion to recover under it should be granted. 
III. The Damages Claimed Are Not "Special Damages" 
Defendants claim that "damages under a contractual liquidated damages provision is an item 
of 'special damage' that must be specially pled." Opp. at 17. In the first instance, Policy 20(c)(l) 
is not a liquidated damages provision. But even if it were, Defendants' brief sets forth no authority 
that supports this proposition. Defendants cite to a 1979 Pennsylvania case that does not involve a 
contractual liquidated damages provision-it discusses tort damages that are "liquidated" only in the 
sense of being "readily ascertainable" for judgment purposes. See Opp. at 17-8 (citing Toth v. 
Glessner, l 6 Pa. D. & C. 3d 338 (1979) (interpreting Pa.R.C.P. 1019(f) to require "not only that the 
4 Of course, under the case law, any provision that leaves the amount of damages "open-ended" rather 
than "fixed" is not a liquidated damages provision. 
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elements of damages be itemized but, where they are already liquidated or reasonably capable of 
ascertainment, the respective amounts of damage attributable to each item shall be set forth" and that 
the allegations were sufficient to "satisfy the requirements of a notice system of pleading, but they 
do not satisfy Pennsylvania's fact system of pleading")). It was also decided under Pennsylvania's 
"fact pleading" (as opposed to Idaho's "notice pleading") rules-explaining why the court insisted 
on more pleading detail. Id This inapposite case neither states the rule for which Defendants cite 
it, nor applies the relevant Idaho "notice pleading" standard. Id. 
Contrary to Defendants' view, the dan1ages under Policy 20(c)(l) are not an item of"special 
damages" that must be specifically pleaded. The only "purpose of requiring that special damages 
be specifically pleaded is to put a defendant on notice that damages other than those which he is 
presumed to expect are being sought." Diaz Irizarry v. Ennia, NV., 678 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D.P.R. 
1988) (applying F.R.C.P 9(g) to contract claim and finding that normal contract damages are not 
"special damages" for pleading purposes) (emphasis added). Federal courts applying F.R.C.P. 9(g) 
(upon which Idaho's identically-numbered rule is based) have held that damages which are 
specifically provided for in the agreement upon which the suit is based are not special damages. As 
the Seventh Circuit put it, "[ s ]pecial damages are damages that are unusual for the type of claim in 
question," and therefore damages are "not 'special' ... where all [the disputed damages] are 
specifically provided for in the ... agreement upon which the suit is based." LINC Fin. Cmp. v. 
Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 922 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying F.R.C.P. 9(g) to uphold an award of unique 
damages because they were specifically provided for in the agreement); see also Greater NY Auto. 
Dealers Ass 'n v. Envtl. Sys. Testing, 211 F.R.D. 71, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying in part motion for 
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a more definite statement and noting that "[p ]lain tiffs do not invoke a claim for 'special' damages 
because such damages are inappropriate under a breach of contract claim for recovery"). 
In this case, Defendants had only to read Policy 20 to discover that Melaleuca was seeking 
recovery of inter alia, wrongly paid commissions. It was or should have been clear to the Foellers 
that they were accused of violating Policy 20. See Complaint ii 8 (alleging that "Defendants willfully 
violated the policies ofMelaleuca ... including Policy 20"). Policy 20 makes clear (as Defendants 
do not dispute) that Melaleuc,a has the contractual right to seek a refund of commissions and bonuses 
paid to Defendants "for and after the calendar month" in which they first violated Policy 20. Simply 
by reading the policy they were accused of violating, the Foellers and their counsel were or should 
have been on notice that Melaleuca's damages included these amounts. It is disingenuous for 
Defendants now to claim, more than a year and a half after they received the complaint, that they did 
not know Melaleuca would seek the damages specifically provided for in the Policy. 5 Accordingly, 
Defendants' argument that Melaleuca's claim for damages under Policy 20( c)(l) had to be specially 
pleaded should be rejected. 
Finally, Defendants' conclusory assertion that "[r]eliance damages are consequential 
damages," and therefore a form of special damages (Opp. at 20 n. I) is totally unsupported. 
Defendants' cases do not equate "reliance damages" with "consequential damages"-they simply 
note that consequential damages are considered "special" and must be pleaded as such. Id (citing 
Defendants cite to a discovery response in which Melaleuca claimed that its damages were irrelevant 
because of this Court's order granting in part Defendants' motion to compel arbitration regarding all 
claims (including damages) not related to Policy 20. This Court, however, did retain jurisdiction over all 
matters related to Defendants' breach of Policy 20. Based upon Defendants' belated allegation that 
Melaleuca's response is incomplete, Melaleuca is preparing a supplemental response to clarify its answer 
and more completely address all aspects of Defendants' Interrogatory. 
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DeRosier v. Utility Sys. of Am., 780 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) and In re Eastman, 419 
B.R. 711, 734-35 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009)). 
Defendants' proposition is unsuppo1ied because it is not true-the "reliance damages" 
recoverable under Policy 20( c )(1) are not "consequential" damages. As the RESTATMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS states in the cpmments to section 3 51, "The damages recoverable for loss that 
results other than in the ordinary course of events are sometimes called 'special' or 
'consequential' damages." RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, cmt. b. 
Here, the agreement itself explained that Melaleuca would be damaged and Defendants 
would be liable in the event that commissions were paid to Defendants after they violated Policy 20. 
Defendants were aware that Melaleuca pays commissions "in the ordinary course of events" unless 
it is aware of a Policy 20 (or similar policy) violation. And Defendants would have known and 
expected that they would receive such commissions unless their breach was found out. Accordingly, 
the wrongly paid commissions are damages suffered by Melaleuca in the ordinary course, and about 
which Defendants were fully informed and aware at the time of the execution of the agreement. 
Accordingly, they are not "special" or "consequential" damages, and were not required to be 
specially pleaded in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Melaleuca is entitled to summary judgment requiring the 
Foellers to repay the $23,855 .81 CDN they were paid for the months of July, August, and September 
2008. 
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THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 








Case No. CV-2009-2616 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Melaleuca is an Idaho corporation that produces and markets various nutritional 
and cosmetic goods. The defendants Rick and Natalie Foeller case are former Melaleuca 
contractors residing in Ontario, Canada. 
The F oellers entered into an Independent Marketing Executive Agreement with Plaintiff 
in September 1999. The IMEA requires contractors to pay $39 CDN, for which they receive 
literature and are eligible to receive commissions and prizes for selling Plaintiffs products and 
for enrolling other independent marketing executives with Melaleuca. The Foellers received 
monthly commission checks from Melaleuca until November 2008, when they ended their 
relationship with Melaleuca. 
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The IMEA contains a non-compete clause and several provisions dealing with 
competition and solicitation. 
At some point, Melaleuca learned that the F oellers were involved with a competing 
corporation, Max International, during their time with Melaleuca. The IMEA expressly allows 
Melaleuca contractors to work for other companies, but does not allow contractors to recruit 
existing Melaleuca customers into any other organizations. It now appears that the F oellers 
enrolled a number of Melaleuca customers in Max programs while receiving Melaleuca 
comm1ss1ons. 
On April 29, 2009, Melaleuca filed this lawsuit in Bonneville County, seeking an 
injunction requiring the Foellers to comply with the non-solicitation provisions of the IMEA and 
seeking damages for refunds of commission money paid to the Foellers since June 2008. 
Following lengthy procedural wrangling, Melaleuca filed this motion for summary 
judgment on July 9, 2010. Melaleuca argues that it is entitled to a return of commissions paid out 
to the Foellers from the time they first violated the IMEA in June 2008, and that no question of 
fact remains on that issue. The F oellers argue that the amount requested by Melaleuca is 
incorrect, and that the provision cited by Melaleuca is unenforceable. 
Following responsive briefing, this matter was called up for hearing on October 4, 2010. 
Following argument from counsel, the court took the matter under advisement. 
After considering the court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the court renders the following opinion. 
II. 
STANDARD 
Rule 56( c ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "summary judgment shall be 
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granted forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." DESI/TRI Vv. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 801, 
948 P.2d 151, 156 (1997) (citing Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 234, 
912 P.2d 119, 121 (1996)). 
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the nonrnoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 
283, 955 P.2d 113, 114 (Ct.App.1998) citing G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 
514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) and Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). However, where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the 
trial court rather than a jury will be the finder of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving 
the conflict between those inferences. Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 
(Idaho 1982). If reasonable people could reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the 
motion must be denied. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 
P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791P.2d1285, 1299 
(1990). 
The nonrnoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided .. ., must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). In attempting to 
establish such facts, "a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is 
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & 
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Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). In other words, "the party opposing 
the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coghlan 
v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300, 313 (1999). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Melaleuca argues that summary judgment is appropriate on its claim for a repayment of 
$31,860.64 CDN paid to the Foellers from June 2008 until they left Melaleuca. The Foellers 
argue that Melaleuca has failed to establish that $31,860.64 is an accurate sum under the IMEA 
and that the provision in the IMEA is an unenforceable forfeiture clause. 
Amount Sought 
Melaleuca originally requested the repayment of $31,860.64 in commissions. Melaleuca 
initially alleged that Tracy Leigh was among the Melaleuca customers improperly recruited to 
Max by the Foellers. However, at oral argument, Melaleuca conceded that the Foellers did not 
improperly enroll Leigh, and that the $8,004.23 related to her sales should not be considered 
against the requested repayment. This lowers the requested amount to $23,856.41. 
The Foellers also argue that Melaleuca improperly calculates the amount paid to the 
Foellers. The Foellers allege that they were never paid for October 2008, commissions that 
would have amounted to $7,968. Melaleuca argues that the $7,968 for October was never 
included in its calculations. 
Examining the testimony and evidence presented by Melaleuca, it appears that Melaleuca 
never included the $7,968 in its calculations. The final commission payment that Melaleuca 
seeks was issued on October 17, 2008 for $7,853.98, representing commission payments for 
September 2008. The F oellers do not appear to argue that they are entitled to the $7 ,968 in 
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$23,856.41 appears to be an accurate sum representing the repayments currently sought 
by Melaleuca. 
Policy 20 
The parties' chief disagreement concerns the applicability and legality of Policy 20 of the 
IMEA. 
Policy 20 is a lengthy section of the IMEA entitled Non-Solicitation and Conflicts of 
Interest. It forms the basis of Melaleuca's complaint against the Foellers. The Foellers argue that 
Policy 20 contains an illegal liquidated damages provision and that Melaleuca's cause of action 
is barred under Idaho law. 
Policy 20 allows Melaleuca contractors to participate in other business activities while 
they work for Melaleuca. However, the IMEA contains a number of limitations on the competing 
business activities. The relevant limitation is: "During the period that their Independent 
Marketing Executive Agreements are in force Marketing Exeuctives and all members of their 
Immediate Household are prohibited from directly, indirectly or through a third party recruiting 
any Melaeluca Customers or Marketing Executives to participate in any other business 
ventures." Policy 20 (a)(i). 
The IMEA Melaleuca Definitions of Terms defines "recruit" as: 
I) To attempt to enroll, enlist, or solicit an individual or entity to join a business, 
program or organization; or 2) to attempt to promote, influence or encourage an 
individual or entity to join a business, program or organization; or 3) to present, or 
participate or assist in the presentation of a business, program, organization or its 
products. To constitute recruiting, such efforts or attempts may be performed 
either directly through personal contact or indirectly through a third party. 
Policy 20 also states: 




Violation of any provision of this Policy 20 constitutes a Marketing Exeuctive' s 
voluntary resignation and cancellatuion of his/her Independent Marketing 
Exeuctive Agreement, effective as of the date of the violation, and the forfeiture 
by the Marketing Executive of all commissions or bonuses payable for and after 
the calendar month in which the violation occurred. 
Policy 20( c )(i). 
Melaleuca argues that the quoted provisions of the IMEA allow it to demand repayment 
of all commission payments since June 2008, when the first violation of Policy 20 was alleged to 
have occurred. The Foellers argue that the forfeiture provision of Policy 20 constitutes a 
liquidated damages policy and an illegal penalty. 
Liquidated damages policies are not per se unenforceable. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held: 
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated damages in 
anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances are such that 
accurate determination of the damages would be difficult or impossible, and 
provided that the liquidated damages fixed by the contract bear a reasonable 
relation to actual damages. 
Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). 
Melaleuca argues that the provision is not a liquidated damages policy, because it does 
not set out a fixed amount the Foellers must pay regardless of the loss suffered by Melaleuca. 
Rather, the contract calls for the Foellers to now forfeit any commissions they received after 
violating the contract. 
Generally, a provision for liquidated damages will enumerate a specific sum to be paid. 
See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 175 (Citing Hamming v. Murphy, 83 Ill. App. 3d. 1130, 404 N.E.2d 
1026 (2d Dist. 1980) "It has been held that to be valid, a provision for liquidated damages must 
be for a certain sum."). 




Though the clause in Policy 20 bears some similarity to a liquidated damages clause, it 
does not require a specific sum to be paid. The purpose of liquidated damages clauses is to allow 
parties to agree to a reasonable sum where it might otherwise be difficult to determine damages 
for a breach; here, the IMEA states exactly how the parties will determine what payment should 
be forfeited. Additionally, as Melaleuca points out, liquidated damages are often valid contract 
tools. 
However, it is not necessary for a provision to be styled as a liquidated damages clause in 
order for it to be an illegal penalty. "[W]here the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is 
arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and 
unconscionable, it is regarded as a 'penalty', and the contractual provision therefore is void and 
unenforceable." Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 
952 (Ct. App.1999). 
Clauses intended to punish a breaching party are not allowed in Idaho contract law. As 
the Court of Appeals states: 
Historically, courts of equity developed a rule, later adopted by courts of law, that 
contractual clauses prescribing penalties for a breach of the contract would not be 
enforced because of the potential for over-reaching and unconscionable bargains. 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 
§ 14-31, at 589 (4th ed.1998). Modem courts continue to refuse to enforce 
contract clauses that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish the breaching 
party rather than to compensate the injured party for damage occasioned by the 
breach. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, § 14.31, at 590. See also Graves v. 
Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954). 
Magic Valley Truck Brothers, 133 Idaho at 117. 
Melaleuca states that the amount requested is reasonable because it exactly matches the 
damages Melaleuca suffered as a result of paying commissions to the Foellers. This argument is 
unconvincing based on the evidence currently before this court. Melaleuca seeks to retroactively 
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take money paid to the Foellers for sales commissions; there is no argument or evidence that 
these commissions were not tied to profitable sales as a result of the Foellers' work as 
contractors for Melaleuca or that these are recognizable damages. Rather, it appears that, lacking 
other evidence, Policy 20(c)(l) acts solely to "deter a breach or to punish the breaching party." 
There remains a genuine issue of material fact as to what damages Melaleuca suffered as 
a result of the F oellers' recruitment of Melaleuca customers and executives into Max. Summary 
judgment is not appropriate on this issue and will be denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORD~D. 
Dated this~ day of December, 2010. 
o J. Shindurling 
District Judge 
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COMES NOW, plaintiff by and through counsel ofrecord and hereby motions this Court for 
reconsideration of the Court's December 1, 2010 decision denying Melaleuca' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for · 
Reconsideration, the Affidavits of Joshua K. Chandler, Frank L. Vandersloot, and Roger in Smith 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this l t day of October, 2011 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By:~ 
Richard R. Friess, Esq. 
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Case No. CV-09-2616 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (2) (B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Melaleuca, 
Inc. ("Melaleuca") hereby moves this Court for reconsideration of the Court's denial of 
Melaleuca's Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-captioned case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Court's December 2, 2010 decision denying summary judgment for Melaleuca (the 
"Decision") should be reconsidered, and summary judgment should be granted. As the Court 
previously noted, "the Foellers enrolled a number of Melaleuca customers in Max programs 
while receiving Melaleuca commission." See Decision 2. Such conduct violates the 
Independent Marketing Executive Agreement ("IMEA'') with Melaleuca at least as of July 2008, 
when the Foellers first enrolled Melaleuca Marketing Executives into Max. Melaleuca has three 
separate policies that make clear that such enrollments constitute a voluntary resignation and that 
no further commissions would be earned after such a breach. These include Policy 20, Policy 23 
and Policy 43. 
In the Decision, the Court concluded that Policy 20 illegally penalized the Foellers 
because it required the Foellers to return money paid to them after their breach of Policy 20. 
However, by its terms, Policy 20(c)(i) merely implements the well-established legal principle in 
Idaho that once a party materially breaches a contract, the other party is excused from further 
performance of that contract. Applying Policy 20 and the "first breach rule" here, Melaleuca's 
obligation to pay commissions to the Defendants was extinguished in July 2008, when 
Defendants materially breached the IMEA by violating Policy 20. To the extent that Melaleuca 
paid the Foellers thereafter, it did so only because the Foellers concealed their breach from the 
company, and without any actual legal obligation. 
The Court's December 2, 2010 Decision correctly rejects Defendants' argument that 
Policy 20(c)(i) is an unlawful liquidated damages clause. However, based on dicta from the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, the Cami required that Melaleuca prove its actual damages resulting 
from Foellers' breaches. It concluded that "there is no argument or evidence that these 
commissions were not tied to profitable sales as a result of the Foellers' work" (Decision 8), and 
71 
that Policy 20( c )(i) was unenforceable as a penalty to "deter a breach or to punish the breaching 
party." Id. 
Respectfully, this Court's decision on this point is incorrect. The Court's ruling rests on 
the assumption that the Foellers performed valuable work for Melaleuca during the period after 
their breach and that the commissions Melaleuca seeks to recover are attributable to that work, 
rather than residual commissions from work performed previously and/or commissions for 
leadership, training and support. Although not fully detailed in Melaleuca's opening brief, this is 
simply not how Melaleuca' s compensation structure works. In fact, the compensation a 
Marketing Executive receives is based on leadership, training, suppo11, and similar activities in 
support of promoting the Melaleuca business opportunity and the resulting purchases by 
Customers. It is generally not tied to any specific sales activity underiaken by that Marketing 
Executive in a particular month. 
Significantly, the Foellers have never claimed they did anything specific to earn the 
commissions they received after breaching Policy 20. On the contrary, the record shows that the 
Foellers did precisely those things that undermine any claim to receive a commission. 
Accordingly, like any other materially breaching party, the Foellers simply lost their legal right 
to continue to demand performance from Melaleuca when they violated Policy 20. Melaleuca 
should not be obligated to continue to pay the Foellers' commissions after the Foellers breached 
the IMEA merely because the company did not find out about the breach sooner. 
Moreover, if the Foellers believe that they performed specific work that entitles them to 
compensation for the period after Melaleuca learned of their breach of the IMEA, then their 
remedy (if any) is to seek equitable relief for work performed (if any) during period after the 
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Foellers' contractual right to receive commissions terminated. If any such relief is to be granted, 
the burden of pleading and proving any claimed entitlement to it is on the F oellers-and they 
have neither pleaded nor proved any such entitlement. Their failure to do so does not render 
Melaleuca's contractual rights under Policy 20 and the "first breach rule" an unenforceable 
penalty. Nor is there any legal presumption that the Foellers were entitled to commissions they 
erroneously received after their acknowledged breach of the IMEA. On the contrary, Melaleuca 
is entitled to a return of its commissions as a matter of contract law--on the plain terms of the 
agreement, which merely implements black letter Idaho contract law. 
Importantly, the Court's Decision is also inconsistent with other rulings in this district 
upholding Policy 20. In fact, Policy 20(c)(i) has been upheld as enforceable according to its 
terms in at least two separate cases by this Court, including Blood v. l1.1elaleuca, Inc. 1 and Jordan 
v. Melaleuca, Inc. 2 Specifically, those courts held: 
Pursuant to policy 43 of the Agreement, Melaleuca had the express right to cancel 
all of Jordan's rights to the November, 1998 withheld commissions on December 
15, 1998, because it had information that Jordan had violated policy 20 by 
enrolling Gapp and Jensen into 21st Century in February, 1998. 
Chandler Aff., Ex. B, Jordan decision at 16, and: 
Because Blood violated Policy No. 20, Melaleuca was justified in enforcing Policy 
No. 42 by canceling Blood's Agreement. In addition, Melaleuca had the 
contractual right to enforce Policy No. 43 which forfeited Blood's commissions 
and car bonus. Blood was the party who breached the Agreement. Melaleuca did 
not breach the Agreement by implementing the contractual penalties for Blood's 
violation. 
1 Bloodv. Melaleuca, No. CV-00-2479 (Idaho 7th Dist. Ct. March 22, 2001) Memorandum Decision granting motion 
for summary judgment (the "Blood Decision"), attached as Exhibit A to Affidavit of Joshua Chandler in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration ("Chandler Aff."); 
2 Jordan v. Melaleuca, No. CV-00-2480 (Idaho Dist. Ct. May 3, 200 I) Memorandum Decision granting motion for 
summary judgment) (the "Jordan Decision") attached as Exhibit B to the Chandler Aff. 
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Chandler Aff. Exh. A, Blood decision at 22. 
Melaleuca failed to bring these two prior decisions to this Court's attention, and now 
seeks to correct that omission to allow the Court to reconsider its decision in light of these two 
prior decisions and the arguments made below. Significantly, these rulings post-date the Idaho 
Court of Appeals ruling in Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. 982 P.2d 945, 953 (Ct. App. 1999) 
cited in the Decision. 
In light of this and the authority set forth below, Policy 20(c)(i) is plainly not a "penalty" 
under Idaho law. As the Court recognized, further evidence may be required to establish the full 
extent of the Foellers' damage to Melaleuca and to the independent Melaleuca business 
organizations that the Foellers raided. However, no additional evidence is required to implement 
the law that commissions wrongly paid after the resignation of a Marketing Executive must be 
returned. 
The evidence presented in the record supports damages well in excess of the $23,855.81 
CDN requested by Melaleuca. The Foellers were instrumental in soliciting several of 
Melaleuca's highest level Marketing Executives to Max International. Melaleuca recently settled 
its tortious interference case against Max International in federal court for $1.2 million. 
Discovery in the case showed more than 500 Melaleuca Marketing Executives that joined Max, 
nearly all as part of the Foellers' Max business organization. The damage caused by this 
unlawful raiding is certainly in the millions of dollars. But Melaleuca has not sought to establish 
those damages in this case against the Foellers. Instead, Melaleuca sought only a return of the 
$23,855.81 CDN in commissions wrongly paid to the Foellers after their voluntary termination 
as Marketing Executives with Melaleuca in July 2008. The court has already determined the 
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amount of these commissions. There is nothing "exorbitant and unconscionable" about requiring 
the Foellers to return their commissions after the breached the IMEA. Rather, those 
commissions can, and should, be awarded to Melaleuca on summary judgment based on black-
letter Idaho law, including prior decisions from this Court. 
BACKGROUND 
The Background information set forth below is intended to provide the Court with 
additional context concerning Melaleuca's policies and procedures to the extent those policies 
and procedures bear upon the Court's conclusion that the Foellers are entitled to keep the 
commissions that are the subject of Melaleuca' s Motion for Summary Judgment. Although all of 
the undisputed facts necessary to supp01i Melaleuca's Motion were included in Melaleuca's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, this additional background information relates 
directly matters not included in the parties' prior briefs but that are relevant to the grounds for 
the Court's decision. These and other background matters are discussed and supported in the 
Chandler and VanderSloot Affidavits, attached hereto. 
Mclaleuca's Policy 20 
1. As noted in the Court's decision, Melaleuca Marketing Executives are free to 
leave Melaleuca and join a competitor at any time without violating Melaleuca's policies. See 
Decision at 2. They may also join and be active in another business. They are, however, obliged 
to refrain from raiding their business organizations or those of other Melaleuca Marketing 
Executives. This obligation is stated in Policy 20 of Melaleuca' s Statement of Policies. The 
relevant provisions of Policy 20 are set forth at ifif 4-6 of the Chandler Affidavit attached hereto. 
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See also Chandler Aff. at ii 11; Exhibit C, Melaleuca Policies and Procedures ("Melaleuca 
Policies"). 
2. Melaleuca's Marketing Executives work hard to attract other Marketing 
Executives and Preferred Customers into their business organizations. Melaleuca must defend 
and protect their organizations from raiding by other current or former Melaleuca Marketing 
Executives, in order to protect their significant investments of time, money and other resources. 
Melaleuca' s Policy 20 provides this protection. Affidavit of Frank L. VanderSloot in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration ("VanderSloot Aff. ") at ii 8. 
3. In particular, Policy 20 imposes a strict non-solicitation covenant during the tenn 
of a Marketing Executive's agreement with Melaleuca, as well as a relatively narrow post-
termination non-solicitation covenant. Policy 20 prohibits the recruiting of Melaleuca Customers 
or Marketing Executives for 12 months following tennination of an individual's IMEA. 3 
VanderSloot Aff. at ii 9. Max International, LLC the company for which Rick and Natalie 
Foeller solicited in violation of Policy 20 - imposes substantially similar covenants on its 
Associates. Chandler Aff. at ii 17, Ex. E. 
4. Policy 20 clearly explains the purpose for this non-solicitation agreement, to 
which each Marketing Executive, including the F oellers, agrees. VanderSloot Aff. at ii 10. 
Policy 20 states that "Melaleuca and its Marketing Executives have made a great investment in 
3 Melaleuca's Statement of Policies defines the tem1 "recruit" as follows: 
Recruit: I) to attempt to enroll, enlist, or solicit an individual or entity to join a business, program, 
or organization; or 2) to attempt to promote, influence or encourage an individual or entity to join 
a business, program, or organization; or 3) to present, or participate or assist in the presentation of, 
a business, program, organization, or its products. To constitute recruiting, such efforts may be 
performed either directly through personal contact or indirectly through a third party. 
See Chandler Aff., Ex. C, Melaleuca Policies at 65. 
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the establishment of organizations consisting of Customers and Marketing Executives" and that 
"[t]his constitutes one of Melaleuca's most valuable assets." Id citing Chandler Aff., Ex. C., 
Melaleuca Policies at ii 20. In addition, the policy makes clear that "Melaleuca may seek and 
obtain from the violating Marketing Executive both injunctive relief and damages for violations 
of this Policy 20." Id 
5. Importantly, under subsection (c)(i), a violation of Policy 20 operates as the 
"voluntary resignation" of the violating Marketing Executive "effective as of the date of the 
violation." VanderSloot Aff. at 11. The violating Marketing Executive is not entitled to any 
commissions payable "for and after" the calendar month of the violation. The relevant 
provisions state: 
( c )(i) Violation of any provision of this Policy 20 constitutes a 
Marketing Executive's voluntary resignation and cancellation of 
his/her Independent Marketing Executive Agreement, effective as of 
the date of the violation, and the forfeiture by the Marketing Executive of 
all commissions or bonuses payable for and after the calendar month in 
which the violation occurred. 
(ii) If Melaleuca pays any bonuses or comm1ss10ns to the 
Marketing Executive after the date of the violation, all bonuses and 
commissions for and after the calendar month in which the violation 
occurred shall be returned to Melaleuca. 
Chandler Aff., Ex. C., Melaleuca Policies at ii 20(c)(i)-(ii). (emphasis added). 
6. As set forth above, both Policy 20 generally and Policy 20(c) specifically have 
been upheld as enforceable contract provisions several times by Idaho district courts within the 
Seventh Judicial District. For example, both the Blood Decision and the Jordan decision 
specifically upheld Policy 20, including Policy 20(c)(i). See Chandler Aff. at ii 4, Exs. A and B .. 
Melaleuca's Compensation Plan 
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7. Marketing Executives are paid commissions and bonuses from Melaleuca in 
return for their efforts to support and provide leadership to expand Melaleuca's independent 
businesses. Chandler Aff. ~ 5. This compensation is calculated based on a number of factors, 
including the products purchased within their Melaleuca organization, the number of their 
personal emollees, their status as a Marketing Executive, the organizational volume of their 
Melaleuca business, and the Leadership Points that they generate through specified activities. Id. 
Marketing Executives are paid monthly, contingent upon whether they were in good standing 
throughout that entire month. Id; see also ~~ 11-12, citing Ex. C., Melaleuca Policies~~ 23 and 
43. 
8. Marketing Executives not "complying with all policies and terms of the 
Independent Marketing Executive Agreement" are not entitled to payment of commissions, as a 
matter of contract. See Chandler Aff. ~ 12. Policy 43 states that "[s]o long as a Marketing 
Executive is complying with all policies and terms of the Independent Marketing Executive 
Agreement, Melaleuca is obligated to pay commissions and bonuses to such Marketing 
Executive in accordance with the Compensation Plan." Id., citing Ex. C., Melaleuca Policies~ 43 
(emphasis added). It also makes clear that "Following a Marketing Executive's resignation, 
cancellation for inactivity, or voluntary or involuntary cancellation of his/her Independent 
Marketing Executive Agreement, such former Marketing Executive shall have no right, title, 
claim, or interest to the Marketing Organization." Id. 
9. Melaleuca's Marketing Executives refer customers to Melaleuca and earn 
commissions on purchases made by those customers. Chandler Aff. ~ 6. In addition to the 
commissions earned by referring customers to Melaleuca, Marketing Executives can also earn 
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commissions by training, motivating, and otherwise supporting other Marketing Executives in 
their efforts to refer customers. Id. This is part of Melaleuca's Consumer Direct Marketing 
business model. Id. 
10. Each Melaleuca Marketing Executive has a "Marketing Organization" that 
consists of the customers referred by that Marketing Executive and the other Marketing 
Executives he or she supports (as well as the customers and Marketing Executives referred 
and/or supported by those Marketing Executives, and so on). Chandler Aff. iJ 7. The total 
number of possible positions in a marketing Organization is 97,655. Id Except for very new 
Marketing Executives, most of the individuals in a Marketing Executive's Organization at any 
given time will not have been personally introduced to Melaleuca by the Marketing Executive, 
but will instead have been introduced to the company by someone else. Id. 
11. The Foellers are no exception to this rule. At the time the Foellers received their 
last check in September 2008, they had a business organization totaling 1,437 active Customers. 
VanderSloot Aff. ~ 16. The Foellers had personally enrolled only 114 of those active Customers. 
Id The remaining 1,323 active Customers had been enrolled by other Marketing Executives, 
each of which was separately compensated by Melaleuca for building the Foellers' business 
organization. Id. 92% of the Foellers' organization was recruited by others and only 8% of their 
customers were actually recruited and enrolled by the Foellers. Id. at~ 22. 
12. Melaleuca Preferred Customers (whose purchases are used to calculate Marketing 
Executives' commission) agree to purchase every month from Melaleuca. Chandler Aff. ir 8. 
Typically neither the Marketing Executive who introduced him or her to Melaleuca initially nor 
any of the Marketing Executives in the seven generations above a Customer has any involvement 
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in facilitating or creating these ongoing purchases. Id. Accordingly, the compensation a 
Marketing Executive receives is based on lea~ership, training, support, and similar activities, and 
is generally not tied to any specific sales activity undertaken by that Marketing Executive in a 
particular month. Id. Marketing Executives are entitled by contract to receive these (mostly 
residual) commissions only while in good standing, including compliance with all of 
Melaleuca's Policies, and providing the leadership required by, inter alia, Policy 23 and Policy 
43. Id.; see also id. iiiI 11-12, Ex. C, Melaleuca Policies at irir 23, 43. 
13. A common tactic frequently used among Melaleuca's competitors is to convince 
their recruits to quietly raid their current Melaleuca Organizations and recruit them to sell for our 
competitors while still being paid by Melaleuca. VanderSloot Aff. iI 24. It is thus vitally 
important to Melaleuca to be able to consider this violation as a voluntary resignation and recoup 
commissions paid in error after that date, to prevent unscrupulous Marketing Executives (like 
Defendants) from doubling their income by collecting a check from two companies (only one of 
which they are actually working for) for as long as they can hide their violation. Id. Without 
these protections, Marketing Executives can fraudulently collect (and retain) commissions to 
which they have no contractual entitlement. Id. 
14. Thus, a ruling by the Court that Melaleuca cannot enforce Policy 20(c)(i) and (ii) 
would do irreparable damage to Melaleuca and to its future viability as a business. VanderSloot 
Aff. if 25. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. MELALEUCA IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT 
OF COMMISSIONS WRONGFULLY RECEIVED BY THE FOELLERS UNDER 
THE FIRST BREACH RULE. 
A. Idaho Courts Recognize and Enforce the First Breach Rule. 
It is well-established in Idaho that when one party to a contract commits a material 
breach, the other party is excused from further performance. See JP. Stravens Planning 
Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 928 P.2d 46, 48-49 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (holding that City 
was excused from obligation to pay planner's fees due to planner's prior breach of the parties' 
agreement); see also State v. Chacon, 198 P.3d 749 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (applying general 
contract rules and holding that defendant's breach of a confidential informant agreement excused 
the state of its obligations under that agreement); Blaser v. Cameron, 829 P.2d 1361, 1365 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (upholding trial court's holding that plaintiff's breach of contract excused 
defendants from further performance, including payment of amounts plaintiff alleged were due 
under the contract); Q Management v. Snake River Equipment Co., 2008 WL 219173 (D. Idaho 
Jan. 24, 2008) (holding that defendant was excused from obligation under a settlement 
agreement to purchase plaintiff's sandwich shop when plaintiff failed to operate the shop as a 
going concern as required by the agreement "because the Settlement Agreement had been 
substantially breached, thereby excusing Defendants from performance"). A breach is material if 
it "touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the parties in 
entering into the contract." Id., 928 P.2d at 49 (quoting Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 874 P.2d 
506, 510 (Idaho 1993)). This rule applies regardless of whether the contract itself expressly 
states the rule. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals' application of this rule in JP. Stravens is pmiicularly 
instructive given the facts of this case. In JP. Stravens, the city of Wallace, Idaho hired a 
planner to provide services related to a downtown revitalization project under a contract that 
provided for the planner to begin submitting bills, and the city to begin payment, upon the 
planner's submission of an application to the Idaho Department of Commerce for a grant to fund 
the project. Id. at 47. The planner submitted the application and began to provide services, but 
the application was rejected and the city made no payments to the planner. Id. After the planner 
submitted a second application, which was also rejected, and the city continued to refuse 
payment, the planner sued. Id. Despite the fact that the planner had provided some services 
under the contract, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's holding that the city was excused 
from its obligation to make payment because the planner had materially breached the agreement 
by failing to complete an acceptable grant application, or to properly advise the city of action it 
needed to take to complete a successful application. Id. at 48-49. Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals held: 
Here, it is clear from the totality of the trial court's findings, including those 
quoted above, that the court found Stravens' breach to be one that went to the 
heart and fundamental purpose of the contract and was therefore material. The 
trial record supports this finding. Therefore, the district court properly held that 
the city's duty to pay under the contract was excused. 
Id. at 49. 
B. The Foellers' Breach of Policy 20 Relieved Melaleuca of the Obligation to 
Perform and Pay Commissions Under the IMEA. 
Here, it is undisputed that Foellers enrolled Melaleuca Marketing Executives and 
customers into Max in violation of their non-solicitation obligations no later than July of 2008. 
Thus, like the planner in JP. Stravens, the Foellers breached the IMEA, despite their provision 
13 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION oF'-
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
82 
of some services under that agreement. As these decisions make clear, that breach excuses 
Melaleuca's performance, specifically, the obligation to pay commissions under the IMEA. 
Therefore, the Foellers were not entitled to the commissions they received after their breach and, 
pursuant to Policy 20(c)(ii), those payments must be returned. 
The Foellers' breach was material, both because the contract expressly so states (see 
Policy 20 ("In order to protect the efforts of all Marketing Executives" "Melaleuca reserves the 
right to cease paying compensation to Marketing Executive who recruits any Melaleuca 
Customer or Marketing Executive to pmiicipate in another business venture") and because 
violating Policy 20 directly undermines the "fundamental purpose" for which Marketing 
Executives are compensated under the IMEA-to "promote the Melaleuca business opportunity, 
to support Melaleuca's policies, programs, and personnel, and to service, supervise, motivate and 
train the Marketing Executives in their Marketing Organization." Chandler Aff., ~~ 5, 11, Ex. C, 
Melaleuca Policies at~~ 20, 23. For the purpose of the IMEA to be served and ensured, 
Melaleuca must be able to require that its Marketing Executives, who are paid by Melaleuca to 
promote Melaleuca, not also promote competing business ventures or products to its Customers. 
Promoting competing ventures is precisely the opposite of what Marketing Executives are paid 
to do. 
Melaleuca's Policies and Procedures expressly conditioned the Foellers' right to 
commission payments on their compliance with their contractual obligations, including the non-
solicitation provisions of Policy 20. See Chandler Aff., ~ 12, Ex. C, Melaleuca Polices at iJ 43 
("So long as a Marketing Executive is complying with all policies and terms of the Independent 
Marketing Executive Agreement, Melaleuca is obligated to pay commissions and bonuses to 
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such Marketing Executive in accordance with the Compensation Plan"). The importance of 
Policy 20 is clearly stated in the parties' agreement, noting that "[v]iolations of Policy 20 are 
especially detrimental to the growth and sales of other Marketing Executives' Independent 
Melaleuca Businesses and to Melaleuca's Business." Chandler Aff., Ex. C. at~ 20(d). 
For a consumer direct marketer such as Melaleuca, non-solicitation provisions are critical 
to maintaining successful business organizations. See VanderSloot Aff. ~~ 24-25. As the 
Delaware Court of Chancery recently noted in granting a preliminary injunction against similar 
raiding activities, "The nature of the network marketing business model is such that goodwill and 
word-of-mouth advertising is essential, as is continuing harmonious relationships among the 
distribution chain. The loss of a distributor deprives the company of her sales revenue, the 
potential sales revenues of her downlines, and the potential sales revenues she and her downlines 
would generate going forward." Zrii, LLC v. Wellness Acquisition Group, Inc., No. 4374-VCP, 
2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167 at *46-7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2009). The non-solicitation provisions of 
the IMEA thus ensure that the "fundamental purpose" of the IMEA-to promote Melaleuca-is 
not undermined by the simultaneous or related promotion of competing products or business 
opportunities. Without these protections, the livelihoods of thousands of Marketing Executives, 
who have no direct contractual recourse against former Marketing Executives who raid their 
organizations, would be placed in serious jeopardy. See VanderSloot Aff. ~~ 24-25. That is why 
Melaleuca must protect its Marketing Executives through its agreements and why it offers 
commissions only in exchange for compliance with important policies, including very 
specifically Policy 20. 
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The Foellers attempt to downplay the significance of their breach by asserting that the 
Melaleuca business of the particular Marketing Executives identified in Melaleuca's Motion for 
Summary Judgment did not suffer because of their enrollment in Max. See Foeller Opp. at SOF 
~~ 16-23. Melaleuca certainly does not concede this assertion;4 however, it is irrelevant to 
Melaleuca's Motion for Summary Judgment. Melaleuca identified these particular Marketing 
Executives because they were some of the first individuals that the Foellers enrolled into Max in 
violation of their non-solicitation obligations. As such, these individuals' enrollment simply 
fixes the time when the Foellers first breached their non-solicitation obligations to Melaleuca, 
and thus fixes the time when Melaleuca' s obligation to pay commissions was excused and the 
Foellers had no right to receive commissions under the IMEA thereafter. That breach is an 
express violation of the Foellers' obligations under the IMEA and a failure of an important part 
of the consideration Melaleuca was to receive in exchange for the Foellers' commission 
payments. 
In any event, the Foellers' breach of Policy 20 was not limited to the individuals 
identified in Melaleuca's Motion for Summary Judgment. Over half of the Foellers' initial 
personal enrollees into Max were current or former Melaleuca Marketing Executives. See 
Chandler Aff., Ex. F., ("Second Declaration of Joshua K. Chandler filed in l'vfelaleuca, Inc. v. 
Max International, LLC, Case No. 4:09-cv-00572 (D. Idaho)), at~ 8. Additionally, discovery 
has shown several hundred other current or former Melaleuca Marketing Executives and 
customers who were enrolled into the Foellers' Max organization. Chandler Aff. ~ 18. These 
individuals include several high-level Marketing Executives with large Melaleuca organizations. 
4 Indeed, as set forth in the Affidavit of Roger Smith, the Foeller's activities have been extraordinarily damaging to 
Melaleuca. 
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Mrs. Foeller has admitted that she personally enrolled Melaleuca Marketing Executives Laraine 
and Raymond Agren and Gwen and Ledell Miles into Max. 5 See Excerpts from Deposition of 
Natalie Foeller ("Foeller Depo."), attached as Exhibit G to Chandler Aff., at 114:1-6, 114:19-
115:2, 202:8-202:25. 
When the Foellers voluntarily chose to violate Policy 20's non-solicitation provision, 
they were no longer entitled to receive commission payments and Melaleuca's performance was 
excused. See JP. Stravens, 928 P.2d at 48-49 ("If a breach of contract is material, the other 
party's performance is excused"). All commission payments after that time were unearned and 
erroneously made. Because Melaleuca had no obligation to pay the $23,855.81 in commission 
payments made to the Foellers after their July 2008 breach, the Court should grant judgment in 
favor of Melaleuca in that amount. Those payments were not earned, they were paid in error and 
would not have been paid but for the fact that the Foellers hid their violations of Policy 20. 
II. POLICY 20(c)(i) IS NOT AN ILLEGAL PENALTY. 
Policy 20(c)(i) is not an illegal penalty. As an initial matter, the Foellers never argued 
that Policy 20( c )(i) was illegal, independent of whether or not it was also a liquidated damages 
clause, and no party had the opportunity to address that question in Melaleuca's summary 
judgment motion. The Foellers' only argument, that Policy 20( c )(i) was unenforceable as a 
5 The Agrens and the Miles (like the Foellers) are some of the very most successful and highly-compensated 
Marketing Executives in the history ofMelaleuca. See Chandler Aff. ~ 14. The Miles were the 2007 Marketing 
Executives of the Year, and had previously reached the status of Executive Director VII with Melaleuca. Id. They 
earned more than $1.38 million while at Melaleuca. Id. The Agrens had been with Melaleuca for 11 years and five 
months, during which they had averaged more than $23,000 per month in earnings-a total of $3.05 million. Id. 
They had reached the status of Executive Director IX with the company, higher than all but a handful of other 
Marketing Executives, and had as many as 5,370 Customers in their Marketing Organization. Id 
17 - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 8 6 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
liquidated damages clause, was specifically rejected by the Court. The Court then found, based 
on dicta from an Idaho Court of Appeals decision, that Policy 20( c )(i) was an unenforceable 
penalty. This Court's conclusion is inconsistent with multiple prior authorities from other 
district courts in this County, as well as binding holdings from several other Idaho appellate 
courts. As such, this Court should reconsider its prior holding and grant summary judgment on 
Melaleuca's limited request for reimbursement of payments wrongfully paid to the Foellers after 
their voluntary termination as Marketing Executives. 
A. Courts in this County have Consistently Enforced Melaleuca's Right to 
Retain Unearned Commissions Under Policies 20, 23, and 43. 
The Foellers do not dispute that Policy 20's non-solicitation provisions are generally 
enforceable.6 The Foellers complain only about Policy 20's provision in subsection (c)(i) that a 
breach results in the termination of the IMEA, and the corresponding termination of the Foellcrs' 
right to receive commissions. However, courts in this county have consistently enforced Policies 
20, 23, and 43, including Melaleuca's Policy 20(c)(i) right to retain commission payments for the 
time period after a Marketing Executive breaches his or her non-solicitation obligations. 
In Jordan v. Melaleuca, Inc., a former Marketing Executive sued Melaleuca, seeking to 
recover commissions that Melaleuca withheld after it learned that he violated his non-solicitation 
obligations by enrolling two Melaleuca Marketing Executives into another business. The court 
held that Melaleuca' s withholding of the commissions was not a breach of the IMEA, stating that 
6 Indeed, non-solicitation provisions such as Policy 20 are less restrictive than covenants not to compete, which are 
enforceable if they are reasonable. See, e.g., Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504, 506 (Idaho 1959). Unlike a 
covenant not to compete, Policy 20 does not prohibit competition. It only prohibits Marketing Executives from 
soliciting or recruiting from Melaleuca, they are free to engage in other types of competition and to recruit from 
other sources. See Chandler Aff., Ex. A, Blood Decision at 15. 
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Pursuant to policy 43 of the Agreement, Melaleuca had the express right to cancel 
all of Jordan's rights to the November, 1998 withheld commissions on December 
15, 1998, because it had information that Jordan had violated policy 20 by 
enrolling Gapp and Jensen into 21st Century in February, 1998. 
Chandler Aff., Ex. B, Jordan Decision at 16. 
Similarly, in Blood v. Melaleuca, Inc., a Melaleuca Marketing Executive presented 
another business to other Melaleuca Marketing Executives on two occasions. He sued Melaleuca 
after it terminated his IMEA based on those breaches of his non-solicitation obligations, seeking 
to recover unpaid commissions and a car allowance that he had accumulated during his time with 
Melaleuca. The court granted Melaleuca's motion for summary judgment, finding that 
Because Blood violated Policy No. 20, Melaleuca was justified in enforcing Policy 
No. 42 by canceling Blood's Agreement. In addition, Melaleuca had the 
contractual right to enforce Policy No. 43 which forfeited Blood's commissions 
and car bonus. Blood was the party who breached the Agreement. Melaleuca did 
not breach the Agreement by implementing the contractual penalties for Blood's 
violation. 
Chandler Aff. Ex. A, Blood Decision at 22. In granting Melaleuca summary judgment on 
Blood's conversion claim, the court found that, as an independent contractor, Blood could not 
benefit from the protections ofldaho wage laws applicable to employees. Id at 36-3 7. The 
court then noted: 
Blood's commissions and car bonus were subject to the contractual forfeiture 
provisions found in Policy No. 43. Blood forfeited his rights to the commissions 
and bonuses when he breached the Agreement on July 16, 1998. That forfeiture 
does not violate Idaho law. 
Id. at 37 (emphasis added). Blood and Jordan both affirm the principal basis for Melaleuca's 
damages in this case once a Marketing Executive breaches the non-solicitation provisions, he 
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or she is no longer entitled to receive commission payments. 7 Therefore, all commissions paid 
after the breach are unearned and Melaleuca is damaged by paying the unearned commissions in 
exactly the amount of those payments that it had no obligation to make. 
In addition to being contrary to these decisions, this Court's ruling that Melaleuca cannot 
recover such payments creates a dangerous precedent, encouraging breaching parties to hide 
their breach for as long as possible. The only difference between the Blood and Jordan decisions 
and the present case is that in those cases, Melaleuca discovered the breach before it erroneously 
paid the Marketing Executives unearned commissions, whereas here, the Foellers' successfully 
hid their breach for long enough to collect commissions for an additional three months. Had 
Melalcuca discovered the Foellers' breach immediately in July of 2008, it would have rightly 
tern1inated the IMEA and made no future commission payments. As in Blood and Jordan, the 
Foellers would have had no right to seek payment of commissions for the time period after their 
breach. See Blood Decision; Jordan Decision. 
However, under the Court's ruling, independent sales representatives like the Foellers can 
ignore their contractual obligations and continue to receive commission payments as long as they 
can successfully hide their breach. 8 The result is that breaching parties are treated more 
7 The Idaho Court of Appeals has also upheld a remarkably similar provision in an insurance agency agreement 
which provided that an independent insurance agent was not entitled to commissions and bonuses after the 
agreement was terminated for the agent's violation of a provision prohibiting him from placing insurance with 
another agency without express permission. Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) 
abrogated on other grounds by Metcalf v. lntennountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 747 (1989); see also In re 
Worldcom, Inc., 361 B.R. 697, 717 (S.D.N .Y. 2007) (holding that non-solicitation provision in representation 
agreement terminating agent's right to receive residual commission payments upon the agent's solicitation of 
customers to another company was not an unenforceable penalty). 
8 As noted in the original motion, on the back of each check cashed by the Foellers was the following language: 
"[inse1t back of check language] _ Aff. , _, Exh. _. Thus, each time the Foellers cashed such a check, they 
knowingly made a false representation to Melaleuca to the effect that they were in compliance with company 
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favorably if they are dishonest or prevent the other side from discovering the breach. Their 
reward for this misconduct is that they are allowed to keep unearned commissions paid by 
Melaleuca, even in the face of an express contractual obligation to return those commissions. 
B. The Foellers' Unearned Commission Payments are Directly Related to 
Melaleuca 's Damages. 
Melaleuca is entitled to choose the damages it wishes to pursue, including reliance 
damages it has incurred in performing the IMEA. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, 
§ 349 (the injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including 
expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance"). Here, The Foellers' 
unlawful recruitment of Melaleuca Marketing Executives damaged Melaleuca in two distinct 
ways, only one of which is at issue in Melaleuca's motion for summary judgment. One way is 
that the Foellers' actions may have caused Melaleuca to lose customers or to gain fewer 
customers, by decimating its sales force and/or customer base. The full extent of these types of 
damage suffered by Melaleuca due to the Foellers' breach is not yet known, but is very likely in 
the millions of dollars. Such damages may include lost future sales and Marketing Executives, 
damage to the business organizations that were raided by the F oellers, and many other 
advantages that Melaleuca would have received had the Marketing Executives and customers 
unlawfully recruited by the Foellers remained in Melaleuca. Determining these damages will 
require analysis and specific information regarding all individuals unlawfully recruited by the 
Foellers. These are the damages about which the Foellers attempted to raise factual issues in 
opposing summary judgment in prior briefing. See, e.g., Foeller Opp. at SOF ~~ 16-23. 
policies, including Policy 20--a representation upon which Melaleuca was entitled to, and did, rely. 
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The value of this damage is far in excess of the $23,855.81 CDN in unearned 
commissions that Melaleuca seeks to have returned. See Smith Aff., 6. It includes all harm 
stemming from Melaleuca's loss of each of the hundreds of Marketing Executives the Foellers' 
unlawfully recruited, including the loss of several high-level leaders. In any event, the Foellers 
fail to recognize that any alleged factual disputes about the full extent of such damages are 
irrelevant because those are not the damages Melaleuca sought in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Instead, Melaleuca was conservative, seeking to recover only for the second way in 
which it was damaged by the Foellers' breach-the monthly commission payments wrongly paid 
to the Foellers after their breach of the IMEA, which Melaleuca had no obligation to make. 
Melaleuca Marketing Executives are paid for many different activities they perform, including 
"promot[ing] the Melaleuca business opportunity, [supporting] Melaleuca's policies, programs, 
and personnel, and ... servic[ing,] supervis[ing,] motivate[ing,] and train[ing] the Marketing 
Executives in their Marketing Organization to sell and market the Melaleuca products and 
promote the Melaleuca business opportunity." Chandler Aff., Ex. C, iJ 23. 
Some such payments are directly tied to specific sales or leadership achievements in a 
current month, such as bonuses tied to enrolling new customers and Marketing Executives. 
However, as in other industries (for example, insurance agents and similar independent 
commission-based sales representatives) the vast majority of the payments received by any high-
earning Marketing Executive are residual payments based on work done months or years 
before-and often by other people entirely. See generally VanderSloot Aff. These residual 
payments have certain ongoing conditions attached, including specifically, remaining in good 
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standing with Melaleuca and in compliance with Melaleuca's Policies, including Policy 20. See 
Chandler Aff. ~~ 11-12, citing Ex. C., Melaleuca's Policies at~~ 23, 43. Moreover, in a matrix-
based compensation system like Melaleuca' s, much of this prior work was not directly 
performed by the Marketing Executive but was performed by someone else who, when they 
enrolled a customer, enrolled her into both their own Marketing Organization,9 and the 
Marketing Organizations of other individuals farther up in the compensation tree. 
Melaleuca makes the residual payments, in part, because the Marketing Executives' 
leadership and compliance with their contractual obligations-and especially their non-
solicitation obligations-is critical to Melaleuca's business and to the objectives of the IMEA. If 
a Marketing Executive ceases to perform these obligations, Melaleuca loses the primary benefits 
it seeks from its Marketing Executives. Instead of "promot[ing]" Melaleuca and "servic[ing,] 
supervis[ing,] motivate[ing,] and train[ing] the Marketing Executives in their Marketing 
Organization," such Marketing Executives take Customers and Marketing Executives away from 
Melaleuca, sow doubt and distrust in the mind ofMelaleuca's Customers, and directly aid the 
competition instead of Melaleuca. It is no wonder, therefore, that such conduct expressly 
terminates the IMEA-what company would choose to continue its relationship with a disloyal 
salesperson that was promoting a competitor's product to its customers? Thus Melaleuca was 
directly damaged when it paid the Fallers to promote Melaleuca while they were in fact 
competing with it for their own benefit. 
9 A "Marketing Organization" is the group of customers upon whose purchases a Marketing Executive may earn 
commissions. It generally includes everyone in a so-called 5 x 7 matrix-the five Customers (or fellow Marketing 
Executives) directly below the Marketing Executive, plus the 25 in the generation below them, plus the 625 in the 
generation below them, and so forth, to a depth of 7 generations. Accordingly, every Customer is simultaneously in 
the Marketing Organization of7 different Marketing Executives. Chandler Aff. ~ 7. 
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These are the damages that were at issue in Melaleuca's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
They are exactly related to the damages caused by the Foellers' unlawful recruitment because 
that breach of the IMEA terminated the agreement and excused Melaleuca from any obligation to 
pay the commissions under the first breach rule and the express language of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, Melaleuca continued to pay the Foellers unearned commissions from July through 
October of 2008 because it was not aware of the Foellers' breach. Melaleuca has been damaged 
in the amount of these payments made after the Foellers' undisputed breach, and it is entitled to 
summary judgment in the amount of $23,855.81 CDN. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reconsider its ruling on Melaleuca's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and enter judgment for Melaleuca in the amount of $23,855.81 CDN. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October, 2011. 
shua K. Chandler 
MELALEUCA, INC. 
3910 S. Yellowstone Hwy 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
(208) 522-0700 telephone 
(208) 534-2866 fax 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served in the method 





Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Rick and Natalie Foeller 
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MELALEUCA, INC. 
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(208) 522-0700 telephone 
(208) 534-2866 fax 
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FRANKL. VANDERSLOOT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. My name is Frank L. VanderSloot. I am the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of 
Melaleuca, Inc., Plaintiff in this case. 
2. I have a degree in business administration from BYU and have been a corporate 
officer in various corporations for over 30 years. I am on the Board of Directors of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and have served on that Board for over ten years. I also serve on the 
Executive Board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. I have also served twice, for the maximum 
time allowed, on the Board of Directors of the Direct Selling Association and have extensive 
experience with companies in the direct sales industry. I believe I have a good understanding of 
business in general and specifically of the industry of direct sales and direct marketing, and am 
considered by many of my peers as an expert in this industry. 
3. I have been the CEO of Melaleuca for more than 26 years now. During that entire 
time, Melaleuca has sold its products through independent sales representatives who are paid 
commission for their efforts. 
4. In my experience, it is the culture of many so-called multilevel marketing (MLM) 
companies to try to recruit leaders from their competitors and then encourage those leaders to use 
the relationships that they built with their former company to "raid" their former organizations 
and recruit individuals from that organization, as well as to entice those individuals to recruit 
others from that same organization to bring their people to the new company. Over the past five 
years, or so, several companies have begun to pay "signing bonuses" or to give "guaranteed 
income" promises as incentives for Melaleuca leaders to switch companies. This is, of course, 
not exclusive to Melaleuca leaders. MLM firms seek out other companies' leaders as well. 
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5. When a tr leader uses their long-time relations to raid their former 
company, there can be tremendous damage to the lives and businesses of dozens, hundreds, or 
even thousands of individuals. 
6. Because of the nature of the many personal relationships established through the 
close-knit culture of most direct sales companies, former leaders have a tremendous amount of 
influence on those they previously led. Personal relationships with the family and friends of 
others can be used to manipulate or coerce persons to make decisions that they would not 
normally have made except for wanting to salvage those relationships. The former leader will 
often threaten to take all of someone's organization and threaten that if they do not come along 
they will have nothing left of their business organization, because it will have been decimated 
from all of the raiding activity. Since a large customer base may have taken them years to build 
up, they sometimes agree to go along because they are afraid they will be left with nothing. 
Melaleuca's Policy 20 Prohibits Marketing Executives From Soliciting Marketing 
Executives To Other Business Ventures 
7. Melaleuca Marketing Executives are free to leave Melaleuca and join a 
competitor at any time without violating Melaleuca's policies. They may also join and be active 
in another business. They are, however, required to refrain from raiding their Melaleuca 
business by taking current Melaleuca Customers or Marketing Executives with them to another 
business. This obligation is stated in Policy 20 of Melaleuca's Statement of Policies. 
8. Melaleuca's Marketing Executives work hard to build and create a successful 
business organization containing both Marketing Executives and Customers. They count on 
Melaleuca to defend and protect these Marketing Executives from being raided by former 
Melaleuca Marketing Executives, in order to protect their significant investments of time, money 
and other resources. Melaleuca's Policy 20 allows Melaleuca to provide this protection. 
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9. In particu olicy 20 imposes a strict non-solicita covenant during the term 
of a Marketing Executive's agreement with Melaleuca, as well as a relatively narrow post-
termination non-solicitation covenant. Policy 20 prohibits the recruiting of Melaleuca Customers 
or Marketing Executives for 12 months following termination of an individual's Independent 
Marketing Executive Agreement (IMEA). Ex. A, Melaleuca Policies, Policy 20, at 64. 
10. Policy 20 clearly explains the purpose for this non-solicitation agreement, to 
which each Marketing Executive, including Defendants, has agreed. Policy 20 states that 
"Melaleuca and its Marketing Executives have made a great investment in the establishment of 
organizations consisting of Customers and Marketing Executives" and that "[t]his constitutes one 
of Melaleuca' s most valuable assets." 
11. Importantly, under subsection ( c )(i), a violation of Policy 20 establishes or 
triggers the "voluntary resignation" of the violating Marketing Executive "effective as of the date 
of the violation." Policy 20 has been upheld as an enforceable contract provision several times 
by the courts. See, e.g., Blood v. Melaleuca, Inc., No. CV-00-2479 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. Mar. 22, 
2001) (Ex. A to Chandler Aff.); Jordan v. Melaleuca, Inc., No. CV-00-2480 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. 
May 3, 2001) (Ex. B to Chandler Aff.). 
The Foellers Were Paid to Train and Motivate Their Business Organization, and 
Benefitted Substantially from Melaleuca's Heavy Investment in that Organization 
12. Melaleuca has invested an extensive amount of time, energy and financial 
resources totaling millions of dollars into building the business organization that the Foellers 
were compensated to train, motivate and lead. 
13. Melaleuca' s Marketing Executives refer customers to Melaleuca and earn 
commissions on purchases made by those customers. In addition to the commissions earned by 
referring customers to Melaleuca, Marketing Executives can also earn commissions by training, 
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motivating, leading and wise supporting other Marketing Ex ves, whom they did not 
enroll, in those other Marketing Executives' efforts to refer customers. This is part of 
Melaleuca's Consumer Direct Marketing business model. 
14. As a Marketing Executive, the Foellers were paid to motivate, train and lead their 
entire business organization, including those who they personally recruited as well as those who 
had been recruited by other persons. As explained below, although Melaleuca paid them in 
excess of $1. 7 million for motivating and training their group, there is substantial evidence that 
the Foellers had never met and had never talked with many of the persons they were being 
compensated to motivate, train and lead. 
15. Specifically, since the F oellers enrolled with Melaleuca in 1999, Melaleuca has 
paid them more than $1. 7 million to build, train, and motivate her business organization. 
16. At the time the Foellers received their last check in September 2008, they had a 
business organization totaling 1,437 active Customers. The Foellers had personally enrolled 
only 114 of those active Customers. The remaining 1,323 active Customers had been enrolled 
by other Marketing Executives, each of which was separately compensated by Melaleuca for 
building the F oellers' business organization. 
17. In addition, Melaleuca also compensated the Foeller's "Support Team" to 
motivate, train and lead the Foellers' entire business organization, including the 1323 the 
Foellers did not enroll. That Support Team consisted of the Foellers' personal enroller plus six 
other leaders above the Foellers' business organization. The Foellers benefited immensely from 
the training, motivation, leadership and support provided by that Support Team. As of 
September 2008, when they terminated their IMEA, Melaleuca had paid those seven Support 
Team members more than $55, 155,940 in commissions and bonuses to provide training, 
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motivation, leadership ai pport to the Foellers as well as seve ther organi7ations similar 
to the Foellers' that fell under their leadership responsibilities. 
18. In addition, Melaleuca invested hundreds of thousands dollars in employees, 
seminars, management, and training materials, in part, to train and lead Marketing Executives 
within Foellers' business organization. In fact, it can be well documented that Melaleuca's 
investment in training and compensating the Marketing Executives within Foellers' business 
organization is many times any amount that the Foellers themselves invested into their own 
business organization. 
19. In addition, Melaleuca serviced each of the Foellers' customers every month and 
processed the monthly order of each and every customer; calculated and processed compensation 
checks for each of the Foellers' Marketing Executives each month; created and maintained 
websites for the benefit of the Foellers' Customers and Marketing Executives; provided all the 
sales materials, sales brochures, product catalogs, and other marketing material to each of the 
Foellers' Marketing Executives and Customers free of charge; and provided computer 
programming, legal services, training, incentives, promotions, regional manager services and 
many other services totaling millions of dollars to help build the Foellers' business organization. 
20. Melaleuca has also invested millions of dollars in training Marketing Executives, 
including those in the Foellers' organization, through several annual conferences held each year, 
for which senior management and other Melaleuca employees spend literally months each year 
planning, preparing and implementing. The Foellers benefitted personally from those training 
conferences, as well. 
21. Melaleuca has also invested millions of dollars in maintaining the Business 
Development Department, which spent hundreds of hours counseling and supporting the F oellers 
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and Marketing Executiv ithin Foellers' organization, as th o with other Melaleuca 
business organizations. 
22. In summary, the compensation received by the Foellers was in return for training 
and leadership activities expended by the Foellers. However the size and and scope of the 
Foeller organization was mostly the result of many other persons and had very little to do in 
comparison, with the efforts of the Foellers. Melaleuca, for example, made many times the 
financial investment in the Foellers' former business organization that the Foellers ever did. And 
92% of the Foellers' organization was recruited by others and only 8% of their customers were 
actually recruited and enrolled by the Foellers. 
23. The Foellers were to have been compensated to "service, supervise, motivate, and 
train," per Policy 23. When they violated this policy and began motivating and training their 
own people to join a competitor they tendered their resignation as is clearly stipulated in Policy 
20 of their agreement. The fact that they never officially informed the company of their 
resignation should not make that clause unenforceable. 
24. Since the common MLM tactic frequently used among our competitors 1s to 
convince their recruits to quietly raid their current Melaleuca Organizations and recruit them to 
sell for our competitors while still being paid by Melaleuca, it is vitally important to Melaleuca 
to be able to consider this violation as their voluntary resignation and recoup commissions paid 
in error after that date. Otherwise, unscrupulous Marketing Executives like the Foellers will be 
able to double their income by collecting a check from two companies until their violation is 
discovered. Certainly the Foellers were no longer "servicing, supervising, motivating, and 
training" their Melaleuca Organization to sell for Melaleuca while simultaneously recruiting 
them to sell for a competitor. Doing both at once would be impossible. Surely, Melaleuca 
should not be required to continue to pay them after they resigned simply because they hid their 
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resignation from Mela Since our accounting departm as never informed of the 
Foellers' resignation, the Foellers continued to receive payment. Those payments were in error, 
but that error was not the fault of Melaleuca. The error was the result of the Foellers' deliberate 
intent and design. 
25. Without the deterrent effect of Melaleuca's ability to recover mistakenly paid 
commissions, competitors will be able to entice our business builders in massive numbers, under 
the supposition that they will be paid by both organizations at once as long as their violations of 
Policy 20 go undiscovered. Such an enticement of double payment until they are discovered 
would be too much for many to resist. Some could successfully hide their violation/resignation 
from Melaleuca for several months or even years, thus garnering pay for supervising, training, 
and motivational work that they never actually did. All of Melaleuca's Policies are incorporated 
in full by reference into the Independent Marketing Executive Agreement each Marketing 
Executive executes prior to emolling with Melaleuca. A ruling by the Court that Melaleuca 
cannot enforce our agreement deeming a violation of Policy 20 as a "resignation" by the 
Marketing Executive would do irreparable damage to Melaleuca and to its future viability as a 
business. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
County of Utah ) 
I, Roger Smith, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a Shareholder of Lone Peak Valuation Group. Prior to Lone Peak, I was a 
Director in the international professional services firm of LECG. I have approximately fifteen 
years of public accounting/consulting experience. Throughout my employment, I have spent 
considerable time calculating commercial litigation damages and intellectual property damages. 
·I also am frequently called on to perform valuations of businesses and various intellectual 
property assets, outside of the context oflitigation. A complete copy of my curriculum vitae is 
attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A. 
2. I have a Bachelors degree and a Masters degree in Accounting from the 
University of Utah. I am a Certified Public Accountant, accredited in business valuations by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
3. I have served as an expert witness assisting Melaleuca in assessing its damages in 
the Max International case and in other cases involving Max International Associates. 
4. While I have not yet perfonned a damage analysis related to Rick and Natalie 
Foeller specifically, I have performed a preliminary damage analysis in the Melaleuca v. Max 
International case, to help Melaleuca estimate the overall damages it suffered as a result of the 
alleged improper conduct by Max. 
5. During that analysis, I necessarily had substantial exposure to the damages caused 
by the Foellers, including the Melaleuca Marketing Executives and Customers allegedly 
unlawfully recruited by the Foellers to Max International. 
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6. Based on the information I have received, it is reasonably certain that, were I to 
perform a complete damages analysis as to Rick and Natalie Foeller, the damages from their 
conduct would be significantly in excess of the approximately $23,000 in back commissions that 
I understand Melaleuca is seeking to recover in this Motion. 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2011. 
By: 
Roger W. Smith 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 2nd day of June, 2011. 





ROGER W. SMITH, CPA/ABV 
36 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Main: (801) 708-7700 
Fax: (80 I) 708-7701 
Direct: (801) 321-6330 
E-mail: rsmith@lonepeakvaluation.com 
Professional Emphasis 
Principal of the Lone Peak Valuation Group specializing in the valuation of closely-held 
businesses and intangible assets for the purposes of acquisitions, sales, purchases, incentive 
stock options and litigation/dispute support (lost profit claims, intellectual property 
infringement claims, shareholder disputes). Also performs various accounting/transaction 
review and analyses. 
2008 to present 
2001 to 2008 
1995 to 2001 
Professional Credentials 
Lone Peak Valuation Group 
Principal 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Financial Advisory Services 
LECG 
Director 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Financial Advisory Services 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP 
Manager 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Certified Public Accountant- Accredited in Business Valuation 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Masters of Accounting- Awarded Outstanding Accounting Scholar 
BS Accounting- Magna Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa 
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Professional M embersh ips/I11volveme11t 
American Institute ofCe1iified Public Accountants 
Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants- Chairman of the Business Valuation Committee 
(200 I - 2002, 2002 - 2003) 
Co-Instructor NACVA- Valuing Intellectual Property 
Instructor NA CV A- Valuing Intellectual Prope1iy for Financial Repo1iing Purposes 
and Books 
"Calculating IP Damages" 
NACVA, Washington DC-Nov 2001 
"Fair Value and Its Implications for All of Us" 
The Journal Entry-December 2002 
"An Introduction to Valuing Intellectual Property" 
The RMA Journal May 2002 
"Valuation and SFAS 141 & 142" 
The Journal Entry-June 2002 
"Valuing Intellectual Property" 
Western States Association of Tax Administrators- 2002 
"Business Valuation Basics" 
UACPA Business Valuation Symposium 
-September 2002 
"Intellectual Property Damages: Guidelines and Analysis," 
Contributing Author, Wiley Publications, November 2002 
"Business Valuation" 
University of Utah- May 2004 
"Valuing IP for Purchase Price Allocations" 
NACV A, Salt Lake City- Oct 2005 
"How to Determine the Value of Your Business" 
Law School for Business People, Small Business Development Group- October 2006 
"Intangible Asset Valuation" 
ACG Corporate Roundtable, March 2007 
"Fair Value Issues in Financial Repo1iing" 
UACPA Winter Symposium, December 2010 
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Roger W. Smith- Prior Testimony Experience: 
Case Name Description 
Utah Resources International, Inc. v. Deposition, 
Mark Technologies Corp., et al. State Comi, Utah 
Traverse Mountain Enterprises, LLC Deposition, 
v. State Court, Utah 
VS Fox Ridge, LLC., et. al. 
Horton et. al. Deposition, 
v. State Court, Utah 
Park City Group, Inc., et. al. 
Mitchell v. Freeman & Jones Deposition, Arbitration 
State Court, Nevada 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC Trial, 
v. State Comi, Utah 
Reott et. al. 
Kortright et. al. Deposition, Trial 
v. State Court, Utah 
Advanced Network Installations, LLC, et. al. 
CRNDLLC Deposition, 
v. State Court, Utah 




Techni-Graphic Services, Inc., Trial 
v. Deposition 
Majestic Homes Federal Court, Utah 
Darol Forsythe, John Forsythe, and PIN/NIP, Deposition 
Inc. Federal Court, Idaho 
v. 
Tri-River Chemical Company, Inc., and Aceto 
Agricultural Chemicals Corporation 
Bonneville Distributing, Inc., Trial 
v. Deposition 
Green River Development Associates, Inc., et State Court, Utah 
al. 
Oliekan Trial 
v. State Court, Utah 
Oliekan 
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